1989
DOI: 10.2307/1073180
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Commentary on "Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies": Political Uses of Structure and Process

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Cited by 19 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…In other words, for most occasions the collective action dilemma is simply too sizeable to overcome. This logic coincides with work suggesting that opportunities to redesign agencies via statute are relatively rare (Arnold 1987;Berkman and Reenock 2004;Robinson 1989;Spence 1997). In total, despite their incentive, given the low probability of success, legislators will expect low policy benefits of statutory intervention when facing a more insulated agency.…”
Section: Insulation and Expected Policy Benefitssupporting
confidence: 79%
“…In other words, for most occasions the collective action dilemma is simply too sizeable to overcome. This logic coincides with work suggesting that opportunities to redesign agencies via statute are relatively rare (Arnold 1987;Berkman and Reenock 2004;Robinson 1989;Spence 1997). In total, despite their incentive, given the low probability of success, legislators will expect low policy benefits of statutory intervention when facing a more insulated agency.…”
Section: Insulation and Expected Policy Benefitssupporting
confidence: 79%
“…This possibility seems to be virtually inherent in this kind of multi-person, multi-jurisdiction delegation. Arnold (1987), Robinson (1989), Horn & Shepsle (1989), Hill & Brazier (1991), and Mashaw (1994) argue that such procedures will be less effective than McCubbins et al suggest. The latter, they assert, can be hindered because a bureau's policy deviation may benefit some of the many principals (e.g.…”
Section: Multiple Agentsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(2) Der Gesichtspunkt der prozeduralen Gestaltung der Prinzipal-Agent-Beziehung ist vor allem von McCubbins, Noll und Weingast ausgearbeitet worden (McCubbins, Noll und Weingast 1987, 1989; siehe für eine spieltheoretische Anwendung Bawn 1995, und als Kritik Horn und Shepsle 1989und Robinson 1989. Dieser Gedanke greift Ideen der New Public Management Theorie auf.…”
Section: Der Ansatzunclassified