Commercial Lobbying in Australia: Exploring the Australian Lobby Register

Halpin, Darren; Warhurst, John

doi:10.1111/1467-8500.12159

Cited by 16 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Scandals in several liberal democracies, such as ‘lobbygate’ and ‘cash for access’, have exposed consultant lobbyists using their personal connections with public office holders (POH) to influence government decisions (Dinan and Miller, 2012; Kaiser, 2010; Miller and Dinan, 2008; Warhurst, 2007). As opposed to an in-house lobbyist, who is an employee or director of the business or organization they represent, a consultant (or commercial) lobbyist works for a professional lobbyist firm and is paid on a contractual basis to represent the interests of a client (Halpin and Warhurst, 2015). Because the integrity of democracy rests upon citizens holding equal political rights, some actors strongly decry the ability of former public officials to sell access to government personnel through the lobbying industry.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consultant Lobbyists and Public Officials: Selling Policy Expertise or Personal Connections in Canada?

Boucher

Cooper

2019

Political Studies Review

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Recent research suggests that there are two different types of lobbyists: those specializing in providing access to their personal connections with public office holders, and those specializing in a particular policy sector. This article advances this research by examining the actual behaviour of consultant lobbyists with data gathered from the Canadian Lobbyist Registry. Specifically, we probe two questions. First, using four indicators found within the literature, we investigate whether the behaviour of consultant lobbyists reflects the well-connected generalist or the issue specialist lobbyist. Second, we examine moving public office holders to see whether administrative officials – who make greater use of technical information – or politicians and partisan advisors – who are more interested in partisan/political information – are more likely to continue to be contacted by consultant lobbyists who contacted them in their previous position. Our results suggest that a more nuanced understanding of lobbying is required. While the majority of activities by consultant lobbyists are consistent with providing expertise to policymakers, a sizable minority of lobbyist activity is consistent with selling access to public office holders. Yet even here, our second analysis suggests that personal relationships may also involve the provision of expertise.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consultant Lobbyists and Public Officials: Selling Policy Expertise or Personal Connections in Canada?

Boucher

Cooper

2019

Political Studies Review

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“…The register requires individuals who are hired by a third party, and who contact senior public servants, members of parliament and members of government, to register. While these data are not very detailed, and have limits and shortcomings (Halpin & Warhurst, 2017), they do provide as accurate a picture as possible of those individuals who have declared to be actively lobbying, at the federal level in Australia, at a given moment in time.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

The place of political experience in lobbyist careers: Decisive, divergent or diverse?

Halpin

Lotric

2023

European J Political Res

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There is broad consensus that lobbyists with government experience are valuable to those who employ them, principally because they possess contacts in government and unique insights into the policy process. Yet the near exclusive focus on government experience as the defining feature of lobbyist careers, means the literature has neglected analysis of the mix of different (and important) experiences that actual lobbyists likely accumulate during their careers. We address these gaps through analysis of the career sequences of over 600 lobbyists operating across contract and in‐house roles in Australia. Using the tools of sequence and cluster analysis, we identify four broad types of careers among lobbyists. While half of all lobbyists have had roles with some direct political experience, we find that distinctions between types of lobbying careers are differentiated by experience in other fields such as journalism, public relations, associations and corporate life. Moreover, our multivariate analysis shows that different career types are more strongly associated with in‐house versus contract lobbying roles. We conclude that scholars should move beyond a focus on ‘revolving doors’ to more directly analyse the range of experiences that lobbyists leverage in their professional lives.

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“…In Australia, political lobbying is professionalized (Halpin and Warhurst 2015). Similar to the revolving door, former ministers and government bureaucrats have joined lobbying firms.…”

Section: Lobbyingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Challenges of Political Corruption in Australia, the Proposed Commonwealth Integrity Commission Bill (2020) and the Application of the APUNCAC

Rama

Lester

Staples

2022

Laws

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Political corruption affects each nation-state differently, but the outcomes are nominally the same: a deficit of public trust, weakened government institutions and undermined political systems. This article analyzes issues of political corruption in Australia by framing them within a national integrity ecosystem (NIE) and addressing them against the proposed Commonwealth Integrity Commission (CIC) 2020 bill. It also discusses prevalent ‘grey’ areas of Australian politically-corrupt behavior where they interact with the private sector: the revolving door, political donations, and lobbying; and the state of Australia’s implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. This article argues for their inclusion within the mandated scope of the proposed CIC. There is a need for strong legislation, both domestic and international, to fight corruption. This article then discusses the application of the provisions of the draft Anticorruption Protocol to the UN Convention Against Corruption (APUNCAC) that may apply with respect to these ‘grey’ issues, and how an International Anti-Corruption Court may provide another institutional model for Australia to follow. Finally, this article links these proposals to the 2021 UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on Corruption and the 9th Conference of States Parties on the UNCAC (COSP9). These events illustrate multilateral momentum and progress on anti-corruption. As a country that has historically supported the UN multilateral framework and its institutions, this article recommends a proactive approach for Australia so that the passing of a strong domestic anticorruption initiative will contribute to the adoption, and eventual ratification, of the APUNCAC.

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Commercial Lobbying in Australia: Exploring the Australian Lobby Register

Cited by 16 publications

References 5 publications

Consultant Lobbyists and Public Officials: Selling Policy Expertise or Personal Connections in Canada?

Consultant Lobbyists and Public Officials: Selling Policy Expertise or Personal Connections in Canada?

The place of political experience in lobbyist careers: Decisive, divergent or diverse?

The Challenges of Political Corruption in Australia, the Proposed Commonwealth Integrity Commission Bill (2020) and the Application of the APUNCAC

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