Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: Evidence From Historical Records of the Federal Open Market Committee

Chappell, Henry W.; McGregor, Rob Roy; Vermilyea, Todd A.

doi:10.3886/icpsr23860

Cited by 24 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Additional research that examines different aspects of central banks' voting records include Chappell et al (2005), Besley et al, (2008), Bhattacharjee and Holly (2014), Brooks et al (2011), Eijffinger et al (2013a, 2013b, Farvaque et al (2009), Gerlach-Kristen andMeade (2010), Jung and Kiss (2012) and Tillmann (2011), among others. Interestingly, Neuenkirch andSiklos (2013, 2014) examine the voting records of so-called shadow committees of professional and academic economists, which provide alternatives to the official voting records of central banks.…”

Section: Literature Survey Of Central Bank Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Central banks' voting records, the financial crisis and future monetary policy

Horváth

Jonášová

2015

European Journal of Political Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We examine whether central banks' voting records help predict the future course of monetary policy in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, controlling for financial market expectations. Unlike previous research, first, we examine the period of the global financial crisis, characterized by a high level of uncertainty, and second, we examine the predictive power of voting records at longer time horizons, i.e., not only for the next monetary policy meeting. We find that voting records predict the policy rate set at the next meeting in all central banks that are recognized as independent. In some central banks, voting records are found-before, but not during, the financial crisis-to be informative about monetary policy even at more distant time horizons. Terms of use: Documents in

show abstract

Section: Literature Survey Of Central Bank Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Central banks' voting records, the financial crisis and future monetary policy

Horváth

Jonášová

2015

European Journal of Political Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…8 For example, in the MPC meeting on 5 April 2001, the committee agreed to cut the interest rate by 25 basis points but two members dissented in favor of a larger cut of 50 points. [5] has been changed but the dissenter would prefer an even larger change. Overall, this nding suggest that dissents arise from committees being more cautious in adjusting interest rates than an individual would be at a given point in time.…”

Section: Voting Recordsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Governor and take place about seven times a year. During the sample period, the Gover- 5 Since the data were collected in the Fall of 2009, the samples for all central banks end in August/September of that year. We have considered extending the sample beyond this period but, since monetary policy in the aftermath of the nancial crisis has been implemented by means other than interest rate adjustments, it is not clear that recent voting records adequately capture the policy stands of committee members.…”

Section: Voting Recordsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Dissent in monetary policy decisions

Riboni

Ruge-Murciá

2014

Journal of Monetary Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. In order to study whether the latter relation is causal, we construct a model of committee decision making and dissent where members' decisions are not a function of past dissents. The model is estimated using voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Stochastic simulations show that the decision-making frictions in our model help account for the predictive power of current dissents. The e ect of institutional characteristics and structural parameters on dissent rates is examined using simulations as well. JEL Classi cation: D7, E5

show abstract

“…7 To wit, the Nash bargaining solution results in the interest rate reacting to unionwide shocks only. Asymmetric shocks are not taken into account here because they cancel out in the negotiation process.…”

Section: Averaging Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates

Farvaque

Matsueda

Méon³

2009

Journal of Macroeconomics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper relates the volatility of interest rates to the collective nature of monetary policymaking in monetary unions. Several decision rules are modelled, including hegemonic and democratic procedures, and also committees headed by a chairman. A ranking of decision rules in terms of the volatility of policy rates is obtained, showing that the presence of a chairman has a cooling effect. However, members of a monetary union are better off under symmetric rules (voting, averaging, bargaining), unless they themselves chair the union. The results are robust to the inclusion of heterogeneities among members of the monetary union. How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy ratesEtienne Farvaque * Norimichi Matsueda † Pierre-Guillaume Méon ‡ § Abstract This paper relates the volatility of interest rates to the collective nature of monetary policymaking in monetary unions. Several decision rules are modelled, including hegemonic and democratic procedures, and also committees headed by a chairman. A ranking of decision rules in terms of the volatility of policy rates is obtained, showing that the presence of a chairman has a cooling effect. However, members of a monetary union are better off under symmetric rules (voting, averaging, bargaining), unless they themselves chair the union. The results are robust to the inclusion of heterogeneities among members of the monetary union.

show abstract

Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: Evidence From Historical Records of the Federal Open Market Committee

Cited by 24 publications

References 0 publications

Central banks' voting records, the financial crisis and future monetary policy

Central banks' voting records, the financial crisis and future monetary policy

Dissent in monetary policy decisions

How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About