This paper assesses the relationship between the impact of corruption on growth and investment and the quality of governance in a sample of 63 to 71 countries between 1970 and 1998. Like previous studies, we find a negative effect of corruption on both growth and investment. Unlike previous studies, we find that corruption has a negative impact on growth independently from its impact on investment. These impacts are, however, different depending on the quality of governance. They tend to worsen when indicators of the quality of governance deteriorate. This supports the “sand the wheels” view on corruption and contradicts the “grease the wheels” view, which postulates that corruption may help compensate bad governance. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

This paper tests whether corruption can be viewed as an efficient grease in the wheels of an otherwise deficient institutional framework. It does so by analyzing the interaction between aggregate efficiency, corruption, and other dimensions of governance for a panel of 54 countries both developed and developing. Using three measures of corruption and five measures of other aspects of governance, we repeatedly observe that corruption is always detrimental in countries where institutions are effective, but that it may be positively associated with efficiency in countries where institutions are ineffective. We thus find evidence of the grease the wheels hypothesis.

This paper tests whether social trust affects total factor productivity (TFP). Using both development and growth accounting, we find strong evidence of a causal positive effect of social trust on the level and growth of TFP. We moreover observe that the effect of social trust on TFP runs through economic-judicial institutions, but not through political institutions. Those findings resist a series of robustness checks.

We explore the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on economic growth, distinguishing between mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and "greenfield" investment. A simple model underlines that, unlike greenfield investment, M&As partly represent a rent accruing to previous owners, and do not necessarily contribute to expanding the host country's capital stock. Greenfield FDI should therefore have a stronger impact on growth than M&A sales. This hypothesis is supported by our empirical results that are based on a panel of up to 127 industrialized, emerging, and developing countries over 1990 to 2010.

We test the relationship between governance and macroeconomic technical efficiency on a sample of 62 countries, both developed and developing. We do so by applying Battese and Coelli (1995)’s method at the aggregate level. We find that better governance, measured by six complementary indices each devoted to a different dimension of governance, is always associated with greater efficiency. However, when governance variables are tested against each other, we observe that government efficiency is the aspect of governance that most robustly affects aggregate efficiency. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004Governance, macroeconomic efficiency frontiers, income,