Common Belief Foundations of Global Games

Morris, Stephen; Shin, Hyun Song; Yıldız, Muhamet

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2611792

Cited by 17 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 34 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Our results therefore differ fundamentally from those obtained by Carlsson andvan Damme (1993), Frankel et al (2003), and Morris and Shin (2007), where equilibrium selection works best once private information is very precise. The equilibria in Proposition 3 rely on a coordination game in the evaluation of this information.…”

Section: One Might Suspectcontrasting

confidence: 99%

Observing each other’s observations in a Bayesian coordination game

Grafenhofer

Kuhle

2016

Journal of Mathematical Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game's payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals that inform them of each other's private information. We show that once agents possess these different types of information, there exists a coordination game in the evaluation of this information. Even though the precisions of both signal types is exogenous, the precision with which agents forecast each other's actions in equilibrium turns out to be endogenous.As a consequence, there exist multiple equilibria which differ with regard to the way that agents weight their private information to forecast each other's actions. Finally, even though all players' signals are of identical quality, it turns out that efficient equilibria are asymmetric.

show abstract

Section: One Might Suspectcontrasting

confidence: 99%

Observing each other’s observations in a Bayesian coordination game

Grafenhofer

Kuhle

2016

Journal of Mathematical Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Our results therefore differ from those obtained by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Frankel et al (2003), and Morris and Shin (2007), where equilibrium selection works best once private information is very precise. The equilibria in Proposition 3 rely on a coordination game in the evaluation of this information.…”

Section: Welfarecontrasting

confidence: 99%

Observing Each Other's Observations in a Bayesian Coordination Game

Grafenhofer

Kuhle

2015

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in

show abstract

“…Our solution concept corresponds to interim correlated rationalizability (Dekel et al (2007)). Morris and Shin (2009) note that there is no difference between ex-ante and interim rationalizability in this environment due to the supermodularity assumptions. Best-response dynamics starting from the largest strategy profile converges to the largest equilibrium in an incomplete information game with supermodular payoffs (Vives (1990)) and the largest equilibrium correspond to the largest rationalizable strategy profile (Milgrom and Roberts (1990)).…”

mentioning

confidence: 81%

“…Our paper formulates alternative but related conditions in games with finitely many actions. We will discuss the relationship of type-sensitivity to the notion of decreasing rank beliefs suggested by Morris and Shin (2009 different from ours. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that for any rationalizable action of any type, the beliefs of the type can be perturbed in a way that this action is uniquely rationalizable for the new type.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities

Mathevet

2014

Games and Economic Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. We propose two characteristics of players' beliefs and study their role in shaping the set of rationalizable strategy profiles in games with incomplete information. The first characteristic, type-sensitivity, is related to how informative a player thinks his type is. The second characteristic, optimism, is related to how "favorable" a player expects the outcome of the game to be. The paper has two main results: the first result provides an upper bound on the size of the set of rationalizable strategy profiles, the second gives a lower bound on the change of location of this set. These bounds have explicit and relatively simple expressions that feature type-sensitivity, optimism, and properties of the payoffs. Our results generalize and clarify the well-known uniqueness result of global games (Carlsson and van Damme (1993)). They imply new uniqueness results and allow to study rationalizability in new environments. We provide applications to supermodular mechanism design (Mathevet (2010)) and non-Bayesian updating (Epstein (2006)).

show abstract

Common Belief Foundations of Global Games

Cited by 17 publications

References 34 publications

Observing each other’s observations in a Bayesian coordination game

Observing each other’s observations in a Bayesian coordination game

Observing Each Other's Observations in a Bayesian Coordination Game

Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About