Common myths of terrorism

Abstract

Drawing from statements by politicians, the media, policy analysts, and researchers, the current study identifies nine myths associated with terrorism and the practice of counterterrorism. We focus on those myths that have special policy relevance since the four al‐Qaida hijackings on September 11, 2001, and the ensuing heightened security concern. Many of those myths generated research articles that, at times, come to contradictory conclusions. Our goal is to provide recent statistics and a literature evaluation to sort out such contradictory results. In the case of the alleged macroeconomic consequences of terrorism to a typical country, we supply updated estimations. Throughout our presentation, we draw from the post‐2001 literature or statistical evidence. Often, empirical methods and procedures have evolved to a point where more clear‐cut and robust findings are now available through better identification and advanced estimation procedures.

Income and Terrorism: Insights From Subnational Data

“…Overall, our study contributes to a wider understanding of terrorism determinants, while particularly informing the debate on the link between income and terrorism (e.g., see Gaibulloev and Sandler 2022). Beyond terrorism, this paper also informs the literature on how GDP/capita can affect non-economic variables, as well as the benefits and costs associated with that development process (e.g., see Bloom and Canning 2000; Gürlük 2009; Friedman 2010).…”

“…However, cross-country research has produced ambiguous and sometimes contradictory evidence for a potentially negative relationship between income and terrorism (Abadie 2006; Azam and Thelen 2008; Walsh and Piazza 2010). 1 Yet, despite the inconclusive evidence, the hypothesis linking poverty to terrorism remains one of the most common myths related to terrorism (Gaibulloev and Sandler 2022).…”

Do Failed or Weak States Favor Resident Terrorist Groups’ Survival?

“…Resident terrorists in failed states are generally domestic operatives who know the lay of the land. In fact, domestic terrorist attacks far outnumber transnational ones in most countries (Gaibulloev and Sandler 2023). In Afghanistan during 1996-2001, al-Qaeda formed a bond with the ruling Taliban who provided a safe haven to al-Qaeda from which to operate even though al-Qaeda’s leadership contained foreigners.…”

Why Radical Movements Collapse and Resurge: Evidence from the U.S. Radical Environmental Movement

“…Negative economic conditions reduce state capacity, they also can reduce the opportunity costs for individuals to participate in violence (Dube and Vargas 2013;Fjelde 2015), and poorer people are more vulnerable to victimization during conflict (Justino 2009). Research on terrorism specifically finds no clear link between poverty, education, and terrorism both at the macro-level (state measures), and at the individual level (Gaibulloev and Sandler 2023;Krueger and Malečková 2003;Piazza 2006).…”