Common Sense, Philosophy, and Mental Disturbance: A Wittgensteinian Outlook

Boncompagni, Anna

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-73993-9_14

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Thornton 113 once criticized that this approach does not facilitate understanding of delusions, but his argument does not inhibit an explanation of delusions from Wittgensteinian certainty. 114,115 Bardina 116 grasped delusions as "abnormal framework propositions" and investigated their differences from ordinary common sense propositions. By contrast, Ariso 12 differentiated two levels of delusions, each corresponding to a specific class of beliefs.…”

Section: Typology In Accordance With Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Studies on the relationship between patients' convictions and Wittgensteinian certainty are also ongoing and widespread around the world, although these do not constitute a unified movement. Thornton 113 once criticized that this approach does not facilitate understanding of delusions, but his argument does not inhibit an explanation of delusions from Wittgensteinian certainty 114,115 …”

Section: Updates On the Concept Of Delusionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Updates On the Concept Of Delusionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the concept of delusions: Global trends and psychopathology in Japan

Kumazaki

2023

PCN Reports

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The present article spotlights challenging conceptual and epistemological issues regarding delusions. A research history of various approaches to delusions in Europe, the United States, and Japan reveals the difficulty of defining delusions. Facing these difficulties, the standard concept of delusions has become thinner than the traditional ones, making its boundary with minority opinions vaguer. Nevertheless, clinical typology and epistemological approaches are contributing to the continuous conceptual refinement of delusions. Both standpoints validate and promote each other in elaborating the characteristics of delusions and their boundaries with non‐delusions. In addition, epistemological inquiries into delusions shed new light on the extraordinarily difficult problems in the relationship among belief, knowledge, certainty, and delusions, contributing to epistemology in general. These approaches to delusions promote the evolution of the concept of delusions and related epistemological inquiries.

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Section: Typology In Accordance With Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Updates On the Concept Of Delusionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the concept of delusions: Global trends and psychopathology in Japan

Kumazaki

2023

PCN Reports

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“…Take one of our most basic hinges, namely, that there is an external world. One might doubt that there is an external world; their own world and reasoning would be almost irremediably disrupted and substituted with delusional beliefs; they would be, indeed, unreasonable ; however, such disruption is, in fact, possible, and it is not a coincidence that the framework of hinge epistemology has been called for in the study of delusions and schizophrenia (Gipps and Rhodes 2008; Bardina 2018; Boncompagni 2018). Similarly, prejudices, i.e., de facto hinges, disrupt and substitute testimonial trust, i.e., a de jure hinge, by preventing evidence from being considered evidence and belief from being considered justified.…”

Section: Objectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prejudice in Testimonial Justification: A Hinge Account

Boncompagni

2021

Episteme

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Although research on epistemic injustice has focused on the effects of prejudice in epistemic exchanges, the account of prejudice that emerges in Fricker's (2007) view is not completely clear. In particular, I claim that the epistemic role of prejudice in the structure of testimonial justification is still in need of a satisfactory explanation. What special epistemic power does prejudice exercise that prevents the speaker's words from constituting evidence for the hearer's belief? By clarifying this point, it will be possible to address two more general issues concerning the nature of prejudice: its resistance to counterevidence and the steps involved in overcoming prejudice. I propose a hinge account of prejudice, based on the recent perspective of hinge epistemology, to help clarify these aspects. According to the hinge account, prejudices share a fundamental feature with hinges: they work as norms of evidential significance, and as such, they determine what can and cannot count as evidence for belief.

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“…There is now a growing literature on the link between later Wittgenstein and so-called enactivist approaches in cognitive science (e.g. Boncompagni, 2013;Hutto, 2013;Hutto et al, 2014;Heras-Escribano et al, 2015;Loughlin, 2014Loughlin, , 2019Moyal-Sharrock, 2013;Steiner, 2018). 1 Consider, for example, that if enactivists share a core idea 2 , it is likely that mind and experience should be understood as embodied by agents as and when they interact with their environments.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wittgenstein’s challenge to enactivism

Loughlin

2019

Synthese

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There is now an established literature on the link between later Wittgenstein and enactivist approaches in cognitive science. However, is this link not just a matter for card carrying Wittgensteinians? Can enactivists not manage perfectly well without Wittgenstein? In this paper, I show why some enactivists should care about Wittgenstein. Focusing on the enactivist view, "Sensorimotor Identity", I argue that proponents of this view can use Wittgensteinian considerations to resolve an issue confronting their view and thereby shore up their proposed dissolution of the explanatory gap. Some enactivists thus have in fact much to gain by engaging with Wittgenstein.

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Common Sense, Philosophy, and Mental Disturbance: A Wittgensteinian Outlook

Cited by 6 publications

References 18 publications

On the concept of delusions: Global trends and psychopathology in Japan

On the concept of delusions: Global trends and psychopathology in Japan

Prejudice in Testimonial Justification: A Hinge Account

Wittgenstein’s challenge to enactivism

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