Common-Space Ideal Points, Committee Assignments, and Financial Interests in the State Legislatures

Battista, James Coleman; Peress, Michael; Richman, Jesse T.

doi:10.1177/1532440012455525

Cited by 20 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…We add to the literature on representation by shedding light on the way constituents' preferences indirectly affect legislators' behavior by influencing the positions of party leaders, who structure floor votes. In this respect, this article nicely aligns with Battista, Peress, and Richman (), Tausanovitch and Warshaw (), Abrajano (), and Jessee (), who use common items and scaling techniques to examine policy representation in the United States as well as with recent analyses of Europe's common ideological space by König, Marbach, and Osnabrügge () and Lo, Proksch, and Gschwend (). Finally, we enhance the literature on legislative politics by highlighting the importance of party influence in legislatures where the main dimension of conflict follows a government‐versus‐opposition logic rather than one based on ideology.…”

supporting

confidence: 69%

“…The key is to rely on surveys of voters and politicians containing a common set of questions. Then, one can use joint scaling methods and these common items as "bridges" to connect the policy preferences of voters to the preferences of the legislators who represent them (Battista, Peress, and Richman 2013;Jessee 2016;Malhotra and Jessee 2014;Saiegh 2015;Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2013).…”

Section: Individual Estimates Of Ideologymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Disentangling the Role of Ideology and Partisanship in Legislative Voting: Evidence from Argentina

Alemán

Micozzi

Pinto

et al. 2017

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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We present a novel approach to disentangle the effects of ideology, partisanship, and constituency pressures on roll‐call voting. First, we place voters and legislators on a common ideological space. Next, we use roll‐call data to identify the partisan influence on legislators' behavior. Finally, we use a structural equation model to account for these separate effects on legislative voting. We rely on public opinion data and a survey of Argentine legislators conducted in 2007–08. Our findings indicate that partisanship is the most important determinant of legislative voting, leaving little room for personal ideological position to affect legislators' behavior.

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supporting

confidence: 69%

Section: Individual Estimates Of Ideologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Disentangling the Role of Ideology and Partisanship in Legislative Voting: Evidence from Argentina

Alemán

Micozzi

Pinto

et al. 2017

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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“…The primary independent variable is taken from Battista, Peress, and Richman's () measure of Roll‐call ideology . This measure is based on the database made available by Wright's () “Representation in American Legislatures” project, which collected roll‐call data from all state legislatures during the 1999–2000 session (Clark et al.…”

Section: Data and Measuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Shor and McCarty () offer a similar common‐space measure of legislator ideology, though it is not the most appropriate measure of ideology in this instance. Whereas Shor and McCarty estimate ideal points using pooled roll‐call data from the mid‐1990s onward, the Battista, Peress, and Richman () measure only takes into account the 1999–2000 roll calls. Given that I am interested in the relationship between a legislator's voting behavior and the electorate's immediate response, using ideal points derived from roll‐call votes cast throughout a legislator's career (and in legislative sessions subsequent to the election in question) makes it impossible to isolate the effect in a particular election.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Ideology in State Legislative Elections

Birkhead

2015

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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In this article, I examine the effect of incumbent ideology on elections in 45 state legislatures, showing that ideological extremists are more likely to be opposed in the general election than are moderates and that extremists tend to do worse in challenged elections than moderates do. I also explore the intervening role of legislative professionalism, finding that in the majority of state legislatures moderation is rewarded, though in the most professionalized legislatures, incumbents are actually rewarded for extremism. These results show that despite the informational disadvantage of the electorate, the ideology of state legislators is an important factor in elections.

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“…The findings call into question a number of studies that fail to account for the aforementioned interpersonal comparability problems in their analyses (Colomer, 2005;Seligson, 2007;Arnold and Samuels, 2011;Remmer, 2012;Wiesehomeier and Doyle, 2012;Lupu, 2013;Zechmeister and Corral, 2013). In this respect, this paper is closely related to Jessee (2010), Shor and Rogowski (2010), Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013), and Battista, Peress and Richman (2013), who use common items and scaling techniques to examine policy representation in the United States. In addition, my study nicely aligns with recent analyses of Europe's common ideological space by Bakker et al (2011), König, Marbach and Osnabrügge (2013), and Lo, Proksch and Gschwend (2014), as well as Saiegh (2009) who uses scaling techniques to estimate the location of political actors in Latin America.…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%

Partisanship, Ideology, and Representation in Latin America

Saiegh

2014

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. Terms of use: Documents inThe unauthorized commercial use of Bank documents is prohibited and may be punishable under the Bank's policies and/or applicable laws. Copyright ©Inter-American Development Bank. This working paper may be reproduced for any non-commercial purpose. It may also be reproduced in any academic journal indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, with previous consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. This paper uses joint scaling methods and similar items from three large-scale surveys to place voters, parties and politicians from different Latin American countries on a common ideological space. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the findings reveal that the "median" voter in Latin America is located to the left of the ideological spectrum, and that voters' ideological locations are highly correlated with their partisan attachments. The location of parties and leaders suggests that three distinctive clusters exist: one located at the left of the political spectrum, another at the center, and a third to the right. The results also indicate that legislators in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru tend to be more "leftist" than their voters. The ideological drift, however, is not large enough to substantiate the claim that a representation gap exists in those countries. Cataloging-in-Publication JEL classifications: O54, C83, Y80

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Common-Space Ideal Points, Committee Assignments, and Financial Interests in the State Legislatures

Abstract: We present a new unified dataset of common-space ideal points, committee assignments, and financial interests for all state legislators in 1999. We describe the compilation of the dataset and offer a few possible applications.

Cited by 20 publications

References 27 publications

Disentangling the Role of Ideology and Partisanship in Legislative Voting: Evidence from Argentina

Disentangling the Role of Ideology and Partisanship in Legislative Voting: Evidence from Argentina

The Role of Ideology in State Legislative Elections

Partisanship, Ideology, and Representation in Latin America

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