Commonsense Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation

Ratcliffe, Matthew

doi:10.1057/9780230287006_1

Cited by 70 publications

(89 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Ratcliffe is more radical in thinking that folk-psychology, even if it is understood in non ToM-ist fashion such as proposed by Hutto, is a philosophers construct: "(…) what is labeled an "everyday", "commonsense" or "folk" psychology and routinely accepted as the core of human social life is actually nothing of the sort and bears little relation to how people understand each other." (Ratcliffe 2007: 2) At any rate, according to these critics ToM is not, as Baron-Cohen would have it, "our natural way of understanding the social environment." At best it is an exceptional phenomenon in social interaction.…”

Section: The Contested Ubiquity Of Theory Of Mindmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the phenomenological literature (and in the remainder of this paper), there is an emphasis on the direct pick-up of intentions and emotions. But understanding others based on character traits, moods, social roles (Ratcliffe 2007, Goldie 2007, Morton 2003 or narratives (Hutto 2008a) is also often described in non-mentalizing terms. Many instances of these ways to understand others can be modeled in ToM-like ways too.…”

Section: Tom As a Model Versus Tom As A Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory

Slors

2012

Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

"Theory of mind" (ToM) is widely held to be ubiquitous in our navigation of the social world. Recently this standard view has been contested by phenomenologists and enactivists. Proponents of the ubiquity of ToM, however, accept and effectively neutralize the intuitions behind their arguments by arguing that ToM is mostly subpersonal. This paper proposes a similar move on behalf of the phenomenologists and enactivists: it offers an explanation of the intuition that ToM is ubiquitous that is compatible with the rejection of this ubiquity. According to this explanation, we use ToM-talk mostly to model or reconstruct nonmentalizing social-cognitive processes for practical and theoretical purposes. The intuition that ToM is ubiquitous is the result of mistaking the model for the real thing.

show abstract

Section: The Contested Ubiquity Of Theory Of Mindmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Tom As a Model Versus Tom As A Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory

Slors

2012

Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For these and other reasons, cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind are increasingly questioning individualist, cognitivist approaches to social interaction, and are instead beginning to take account of the body and of interaction processes between embodied subjects (Reddy and Morris 2004;Gallagher 2005;Ratcliffe 2007;De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007;Schilbach et al 2013). Embodied and situated approaches to explaining social understanding now seem, to many scientists and philosophers as well, reflective of our intuitions about social understanding.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Grasping intersubjectivity: an invitation to embody social interaction research

Jaegher

Pieper²,

Clénin

et al. 2016

Phenom Cogn Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Underlying the recent focus on embodied and interactive aspects of social understanding are several intuitions about what roles the body, interaction processes, and interpersonal experience play. In this paper, we introduce a systematic, hands-on method for investigating the experience of interacting and its role in intersubjectivity. Special about this method is that it starts from the idea that researchers of social understanding are themselves one of the best tools for their own investigations. The method provides ways for researchers to calibrate and to trust themselves as sophisticated instruments to help generate novel insights into human interactive experience. We present the basics of the method, and two empirical studies. The first is a videostudy on autism, which shows greater refinement in the way people with autism embody their social interactions than previously thought. The second is a study of thinking in live interactions, which provides insight into the common feeling that too much thinking can hamper interaction, and into how this kind of interactional awkwardness might be unblocked.

show abstract

“…This model concerning the conditions for intentional action was subsequently adopted as a model for the folk psychological interpretation of action. The last decade has witnessed a growing dissatisfaction with this belief-desire model of action interpretation among philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists (e.g., Gallagher and Zahavi 2008;Ratcliffe 2007;Gallese 2005). Many of our everyday social interactions, these critics argue, don't seem to be adequately characterized as instances of belief-desire pair attribution.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Making Folk Psychology Explicit

Strijbos

Bruin

2010

Philosophia

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

One of the central explananda in the debate on social cognition is the interpretation of other people in terms of reasons for action. There is a growing dissatisfaction among participants in the debate concerning the descriptive adequacy of the traditional belief-desire model of action interpretation. Applying this model as an explanatory model at the subpersonal level threatens to leave the original explanandum largely unarticulated. Against this background we show how Brandom's deontic scorekeeping model can be used as a valuable descriptive tool for making folk psychology explicit. Following Brandom's non-formalist and nonmentalistic account of reason discourse, we suggest that the process of making sense of others is best captured as proceeding from a 'factive' baseline. According to this picture the ascription of beliefs and desires is not the default interpretation strategy, but rather the result of prior scaffolding of the agent's deontic score. We close by discussing Brandom's model in the light of empirical findings on the ontogeny of reason attribution.

show abstract

Commonsense Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation

Cited by 70 publications

References 0 publications

The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory

The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory

Grasping intersubjectivity: an invitation to embody social interaction research

Making Folk Psychology Explicit

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About