The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory

Slors, M.V.P.

doi:10.1080/0020174x.2012.716205

Cited by 9 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 62 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…(Apperly 2011, p. 9, p. 179) Although there is wide agreement that theory of mind poses a computationally intractable problem, precisely which aspects of theory of mind are sources of this intractability is highly debated (cf. Apperly 2011;Carruthers 2006;Haselager 1997;Levinson 2006;Slors 2012;Zawidzki 2013). One aspect that is recognized in the literature as potentially aggravating the computational load of theory of mind, is the use of higher-order thinking, such as the attribution of beliefs about beliefs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Parameterized Complexity of Theory of Mind Reasoning in Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Pol

Rooij

Szymanik

2018

J of Log Lang and Inf

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Theory of mind refers to the human capacity for reasoning about others' mental states based on observations of their actions and unfolding events. This type of reasoning is notorious in the cognitive science literature for its presumed computational intractability. A possible reason could be that it may involve higher-order thinking (e.g., 'you believe that I believe that you believe'). To investigate this we formalize theory of mind reasoning as updating of beliefs about beliefs using dynamic epistemic logic, as this formalism allows to parameterize 'order of thinking.' We prove that theory of mind reasoning, so formalized, indeed is intractable (specifically, PSPACE-complete). Using parameterized complexity we prove, however, that the 'order parameter' is not a source of intractability. We furthermore consider a set of alternative parameters and investigate which of them are sources of intractability. We discuss the implications of these results for the understanding of theory of mind.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Parameterized Complexity of Theory of Mind Reasoning in Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Pol

Rooij

Szymanik

2018

J of Log Lang and Inf

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…ToM-like theories take it that social cognition comes down to inference, where it is not spelt out how individuals come equipped with the tools for inference. This is a problem largely diagnosed by enactivists (Gallagher, 2001(Gallagher, , 2006de Bruin et al, 2011;Hutto et al, 2011;Slors, 2012;Abramova and Slors, 2015;Fernández Castro and Heras-Escribano, 2020;Hipólito et al, 2020;Lindblom, 2020). It is thereby with surprise that we see Veissière et al 's (2020) TTOM aligning with enactivism, as they say, 'cognition as an embodied, enactive, affective process involving cultural affordances' (p. 1, emphasis added).…”

Section: Andmentioning

confidence: 89%

“…Many well-known philosophical arguments have been raised in recent literature alone by the embodied and enactive cognitive science against the mind reading ToM (Gallagher, 2001(Gallagher, , 2006de Bruin et al, 2011;Hutto et al, 2011;Slors, 2012;Abramova and Slors, 2015;Fernández Castro and Heras-Escribano 2020;Heersmink, 2020;Heras-Escribano, 2020;Hipólito et al, 2020;Lindblom, 2020; see also Menary and Gillett, 2016).…”

Section: Something's Gotta Give: Rejecting 'Enactive' Inference Throu...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Enactive-Dynamic Social Cognition and Active Inference

Hipólito

2022

Front. Psychol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This aim of this paper is two-fold: it critically analyses and rejects accounts blending active inference as theory of mind and enactivism; and it advances an enactivist-dynamic understanding of social cognition that is compatible with active inference. While some social cognition theories seemingly take an enactive perspective on social cognition, they explain it as the attribution of mental states to other people, by assuming representational structures, in line with the classic Theory of Mind (ToM). Holding both enactivism and ToM, we argue, entails contradiction and confusion due to two ToM assumptions widely known to be rejected by enactivism: that (1) social cognition reduces to mental representation and (2) social cognition is a hardwired contentful ‘toolkit’ or ‘starter pack’ that fuels the model-like theorising supposed in (1). The paper offers a positive alternative, one that avoids contradictions or confusion. After rejecting ToM-inspired theories of social cognition and clarifying the profile of social cognition under enactivism, that is without assumptions (1) and (2), the last section advances an enactivist-dynamic model of cognition as dynamic, real-time, fluid, contextual social action, where we use the formalisms of dynamical systems theory to explain the origins of socio-cognitive novelty in developmental change and active inference as a tool to demonstrate social understanding as generalised synchronisation.

show abstract

“…Beyond the computational intractability of building such a theory, an even more compelling reason to believe such a thing is not going on is that the weighting factor is arbitrary for each individual, paving the way for a "utility monster" [40] to arise, in which one individual's reward dominates all others. 2 Although the view of the mind as being able to infer a model of other minds has become nearly incontrovertible in psychology [14], proposals that go beyond theory of mind are being investigated [11,30,43,49], and the ideas presented here fall into this category. These proposals are for a "minimal theory of mind" in which "we have one system for computationally efficient but inflexible mindreading and another system for flexible but cognitively demanding mindreading" [49, p.20].…”

Section: Jesse Hoeymentioning

confidence: 99%

Embodied Conversational Agents (ECAs): Do you want them on your team?

Hoey¹

2022

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

If you want ECAs on your team, you'll want them to understand how you do things. You'll also want to understand how they do things. Ideally your team's actions should be synchronized, yet complementary to some degree. That is, you seek an efficient and feasible division of labour. The ``you-things'' and the ``they-things'' have to be complete (they have to cover all the sub-tasks leading to the goal), and as sound as possible (any overlap decreases efficiency). This paper argues that, due to the impenetrability of beliefs, an artificial agent will be unable to join a group with such synchronized diversity by attempting to find a balance between its own beliefs and preferences and others' beliefs and preferences (i.e., a theory of mind). Instead, successful group membership requires ignoring individual utility, and taking actions to make the world (an everyone in it) as predictable as possible. Agents will be more predictable if they not only do the ``they-things,'' but also make it clear to others what those things are. However, the group's goals are shaped by the actions of its members, and so a boundary that identifies group membership is necessary. In essence, all agents must be able to identify to which group they belong. After filling in the argument, I give a short introduction to an emotional identity theory that may provide a way forward, and attempt to convince you that you will want ECAs on your team, but only after solving this division of labour.

show abstract

The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory

Cited by 9 publications

References 62 publications

Parameterized Complexity of Theory of Mind Reasoning in Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Parameterized Complexity of Theory of Mind Reasoning in Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Enactive-Dynamic Social Cognition and Active Inference

Embodied Conversational Agents (ECAs): Do you want them on your team?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About