Communication in Coordination Games

Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game

“…The regressions reported in Table 2 confirm that the likelihood to play the SPNE is significantly higher in the two treatments with communication (model (1)). This result is in accordance with the literature showing that communication considerably increases the likelihood of coordination on an efficient equilibrium (Cooper et al, 1992;Blume and Ortmann, 2007;Brandts and Cooper, 2007). In contrast, model (3) shows that giving a stronger influence to one of the pair member does not affect coordination.…”

A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk

“…These results are very close to predictions based on Farrell's [18,19] analyses. 10 When desirable outcomes do not require symmetry-breaking, as in the Stag Hunt games used in the studies discussed here, communication appears to play an important reassurance role, allowing subjects to coordinate on more efficient equilibria by reducing their uncertainty about each other's decisions. By contrast with symmetry-breaking, reassurance is best accomplished via two-sided communication, which yielded frequencies of coordination on the efficient equilibrium of 900 , versus 530 with one-sided communication and virtually zero without communication [11].…”

“…When a desirable outcome requires symmetry-breaking, one-sided communication is much more effective than two-sided communication, with coordination frequencies of 95 0 in Battle of the Sexes (almost always on the Sender's favorite equilibrium), versus 550 with two-sided communication and 410 with no communication [9,10,11]. With two-sided communication, multiple rounds are more effective than one round, with coordination frequencies of 63 0 versus 550 [9], but these stop well short of yielding efficiency.…”

“…It is intriguing to compare the results of [9,10,11] with those of the experimental study of``0-sided'' communication in Van Huyck, Gilette, and Battalio [38], in which subjects were not allowed to communicate but were given a public, nonbinding suggestion about which equilibrium to play. Suggestions of one of three isomorphic, symmetric, and efficient equilibria were very effective, with a coordination rate of 980 versus 40 0 without a suggestion; but suggestions of inefficient or``unfair'' equilibria were far less effective, with coordination rates of 17 25 0 and 160 respectively.…”

Coordination in organizations: A game-theoretic perspective

“…This required level of assurance seems to be too high. Cooper et al (1992Cooper et al ( , 1994) also studied the impact of one-way and twoway communication on assurance and subsequent choices. Under one-way communication, only one player sends a message announcing the action she intends to select.…”