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Thie paper uses experiments to invntigate the evolutioa o(communication. We conàder simple gamea of information transmiuion ia which lhe interests of senders and receivers are imperfectly aligned. We show that under (our canonical incentive condilions tbe nocommunicatioa bypothesia can be rejected with and without literal meaniags. Commnnicative outcomes are leas likely to evolve and, if lhey do, evdve more slowly without a commonly understood language. Wben we see COmmnAICM tive outcomes, they tead to utisfy a portid eommon intered coadition. Equilibria ue useful guidepwls for analyaiag outcomn but are eot always oblained; e.q., with literal meanings we obnerve stable sacker behavior and adherence to focal meanings aad, withoul lileral meanings, combinaláns of actions lhat could not coeziat under any equilibrium.

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