Communication with Detectable Deceit

Dziuda, Wioletta; Salas, Christian

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3234695

Cited by 16 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…One justification for the assumption of lie detection comes from Dziuda and Salas (2018). They suggest that if the state of the world is relatively complex (e.g.…”

Section: Discussion Of the Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lies and consequences

Balbuzanov

2019

Int J Game Theory

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I study a strategic-communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with partially aligned preferences. The receiver is endowed with the ability to probabilistically detect if the sender is lying. Specifically, if the sender is making a false claim about her type, with some commonly known probability p the receiver additionally observes a private signal indicating that the sender is lying. The main result is that the receiver's stochastic lie-detection ability makes fully revealing equilibria-the best outcome for the receiver-possible, even for small p (less than 1 2). Additionally, if the language consists of precise messages, fully revealing equilibria exist only for p = 1 and for a set of intermediate values of p that is bounded away from 0 and 1, making the maximal ex-ante expected equilibrium utility of the receiver non-monotone in p. If vague messages are allowed, full revelation can be supported for all large enough p, overturning the non-monotonicity and improving communication outcomes relative to the precise-language case.

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“…One justification for the assumption of lie detection comes from Dziuda and Salas (2018). They suggest that if the state of the world is relatively complex (e.g.…”

Section: Discussion Of the Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lies and consequences

Balbuzanov

2019

Int J Game Theory

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“…For example, Kartik and Sobel [23] study a CS cheap-talk game in which M is linearly ordered and in which players are restricted to monotonic strategies. 12 The monotonicity restriction does not eliminate any equilibrium type-action distributions. Nevertheless, Kartik and Sobel [23] show the only equilibrium that survives iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies uses the highest N * messages (where N * is the maximum number of actions induced in any equilibrium).…”

Section: Remarkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lying and Deception in Games

Sobel¹

2020

Journal of Political Economy

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This article proposes definitions of lying, deception, and damage in strategic settings. Lying depends on the existence of accepted meanings for messages, but does not require a model of how the audience responds to messages. Deception does require a model of how the audience interprets messages, but does not directly refer to consequences. Damage requires consideration of the consequences of messages. Lies need not be deceptive. Deception does not require lying. Lying and deception are compatible with equilibrium. I give conditions under which deception must be damaging.

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“…They restrict their analysis to direct mechanisms, and they specify the probabilities with which each type can successfully mimic each other type. Dziuda and Salas (2018) and Balbuzanov (2019) study a setting without commitment in which these probabilities are constant. 22…”

Section: Review Of Verification Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design

Ball

Kattwinkel

2019

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

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We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in a mechanism design setting. The principal verifies the agent's claims with statistical tests. The agent's probability of passing each test depends on his type. In our framework, the revelation principle holds. We characterize whether each type has an associated test that best screens out all the other types. In that case, the testing technology can be represented in a tractable reduced form. In a quasilinear environment, we solve for the revenue-maximizing mechanism by introducing a new expression for the virtual value that encodes the effect of testing.

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Communication with Detectable Deceit

Cited by 16 publications

References 40 publications

Lies and consequences

Lies and consequences

Lying and Deception in Games

Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design

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