Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. In a legislative setting, this model shows that the inertial e¤ect of the endogenous status quo can be mitigated by concentrating decision power, and can be eliminated by sunset provisions. JEL Classi…cation Numbers: C73, D72, D78 Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

Despite the expectations of economists that the euro changeover would have no effect on prices, European consumers perceived the opposite. To shed some light on this puzzle, we develop a model of imperfect information in which cheaper goods experience higher price growth after the changeover. Retailers, aware of consumers' difficulties in adopting the new currency, use currency changeovers to increase profits by increasing prices. The lower the price transparency after the changeover, the higher the euro-related inflation. Using data on inflation (Eurostat) and price levels (Economist Intelligence Unit), we show that although the euro changeover did not significantly increase inflation, it nevertheless had a distortionary effect on prices. After the changeover, cheaper goods had higher inflation, and this effect was stronger in countries in which people found dealing with the new currency problematic. Copyright (c) 2009 The Ohio State University.

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We propose a model of delegated asset management in which individual investors are more informed about the domestic market than the foreign market and face uncertainty about quality of portfolio managers. The model shows that asymmetric information of individual investors results in home bias even if professional fund managers are equally well informed about all markets. Additionally, the model generates predictions about the size and the quality of mutual funds that are consistent with empirical studies: there are fewer mutual funds investing domestically, but their quality and market value are higher.

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