Strategic argumentation

Dziuda, Wioletta

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.017

Cited by 68 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…See also de Bettignies and Zabojnik (2014). In particular, our result that, even when censorship is costless, the ruler does not censor all the bad news (Corollary 1) resonates with Dziuda (2011) who shows that a biased expert may provide information unfavorable to his preferences to convince the decision maker that the expert is not biased.…”

supporting

confidence: 57%

State Censorship

Shadmehr

Bernhardt

2015

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

101

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supporting

confidence: 57%

State Censorship

Shadmehr

Bernhardt

2015

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

101

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“…29 Glazer and Rubinstein [37] and [38] examine related simple models of persuasion. The Sender can make a statement about the state of the world.…”

Section: Verifiable Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Dziuda [29] studies a model of strategic argumentation in which an informed Sender has hard evidence both for and against her desired outcome. The Sender may disclose or suppress these arguments.…”

Section: Verifiable Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Giving and Receiving Advice

Sobel

2013

Advances in Economics and Econometrics

102

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This paper reviews literature on communication between informed experts and uninformed decision makers. The research provides some insight into what constitutes a persuasive statement and under what conditions a decision maker will benefit from consulting an expert. I classify the literature along four dimensions: strategic, technological, institutional, and cultural. To the extent that decision makers and experts have different preferences, communication creates strategic problems. Technological considerations describe the domain of uncertainty, the cost of acquiring information, and the cost of manipulating information. The institution determines who has responsibility for making decisions and the rules that govern communication. Cultural factors describe the way in which agents interpret language.

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“…Investments in the overall service level are endogenized in 8 Moreover, Armstrong and Zhou (2011) show how a retailer affects the prominence of search goods. Dziuda (2011) shows that a biased expert can use strategic argumentation to mislead clients searching for the best match. Inderst and Ottaviani (2009a,b) analyze over-selling of a single product when retailers provide multiple services and biased advice with only one strategic producer and two products, respectively.…”

Section: Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resale Price Maintenance and Manufacturer Competition for Retail Services

Hunold

Muthers

2012

SSRN Journal

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Non-technical summaryResale price maintenance (RPM) arises when a manufacturer fixes the price at which retailers resell the manufacturer's products. There is wide consensus among policymakers and economists that RPM can facilitate collusion among manufacturers and among retailers. RPM can also be used by a manufacturer to exclude more efficient rivals. Yet the US Supreme Court overturned the long standing per-se illegality of minimum RPM with the Leegin decision of 2007. Courts now have to judge minimum RPM under the rule of reason. On the other side of the Atlantic, the European Commission decided to keep minimum and fixed RPM as core restrictions of competition in the renewed vertical block exemption of 2010, but the guidelines now specify when minimum RPM may be legal.The dominant efficiency defense both in Leegin and the European guidelines are service incentives: A manufacturer uses minimum RPM to provide retailers with the appropriate incentives for socially desirable services that would be under-provided with price competition. The economic foundation of this argument rests on models with a single manufacturer. Yet in many RPM cases, including Leegin, competing manufacturers sell through common retailers.With this paper, we shed light on the effects of RPM when competing manufacturers sell their products through common retailers who provide sales services. We set up a model which shows that if the competitive retail margins are low, each manufacturer fixes a minimum price to induce favorable retail services. With symmetric manufacturers, products are equally profitable in equilibrium and no product is favored, as without RPM, but retail prices are higher. We show that minimum RPM can create a prisoner's dilemma for manufacturers without increasing and possibly even decreasing the overall service quality.Competition policy has to distinguish between cases in which externalities yield an insufficient level of retail services and cases in which the service level is sufficient or even better without RPM. The danger is that competition policy relies too much on the established service arguments with a single manufacturer, which suggest that minimum RPM increases efficiency. Within our model, raising retail margins of only one product through minimum RPM indeed induces retailers to allocate more services to that product.Hence a manufacturer can demonstrate that minimum RPM is effective in increasing services for its product. However, if our model applies, mini...

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Strategic argumentation

Cited by 68 publications

References 27 publications

State Censorship

State Censorship

Giving and Receiving Advice

Resale Price Maintenance and Manufacturer Competition for Retail Services

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