Communication With Unknown Perspectives

Abstract

IN THIS SUPPLEMENT, we consider some additional properties of long-run dynamics in Section A. Section B contains two variants of our model: a two-sided case in which the sets of observers and experts are disjoint, and a case with delayed observability of states. A model of shifting perspectives is explored in Section C. A. FURTHER PROPERTIES OF LONG-RUN DYNAMICSWe write b t ij = 1 if the link ij is broken at t. The following corollary of Proposition 1 establishes the frequency with which each g ∈ G is realized in the long run, where j t = (j 1t j nt ) is the historydependent network realized at time t.

Method in the madness? A meta-analysis on the strategic implications of decision comprehensiveness

“…Moreover, recent research in Economics has also supported the notion that comprehensiveness leads to desirable organizational outcomes, such as higher-quality decisions, (e.g. Sethi and Yildiz, 2016), increased profits in the book publishing context (Bar-Isaac et al, 2012), and effective uses of human capital (Brynjolfsson and McElheran, 2016). Overall, these arguments and findings considered together suggest that strategic decision comprehensiveness leads to desirable organizational outcomes.…”

The Coevolution of Segregation, Polarized Beliefs, and Discrimination: The Case of Private versus State Education

“…In our model endogenous segregation can result in homophily, and thus, given selection bias, induces polarised beliefs which then further segregation. Related to this is a paper by Sethi and Yildiz (2016) who show how beliefs can polarise when individuals choose which experts to listen to. In their model one chooses a "familiar" expert from whom they can easily learn, whereas in our model an individual chooses their network of individuals with similar beliefs so that their o¤spring's belief does not stray away too much from their own.…”

Higher Order Information Complementarities and Polarization

“…There is a growing literature that studies how individuals acquire signals in similar Gaussian environments. Sethi and Yildiz (2016) ] study an environment where individuals do not know other priors and choose whom to observe, so they can simultaneously learn about the state and others' priors. Liang, Mu, and Syrgkanis (2017) study information acquisition patterns by two agents, a myopic one and a fully rational one, when the agents can decide sequentially which signals to acquire from a set of correlated signals that identify the state.…”

“…The paper whose results resemble mine the most is Sethi and Yildiz (2018). In their environment individuals have different priors and can decide whom to observe over every period.…”