Community-based natural resource management: governing the commons

Abstract

Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) focuses on the collective management of ecosystems to promote human well-being and aims to devolve authority for ecosystem management to the local (community) level. CBNRM therefore requires strong investments in capacity development of local institutions and governance structures. CBNRM has come under strong criticism for its failures to deliver real benefits to communities. In this paper we explore the reasons for the frequent failure of CBNRM. We postulate that good governance buffers CBNRM against unexpected change, notably conflicts, especially in the early stages when income generation, infrastructure development and capacity development have not yet taken place. We assess the key characteristics of CBNRM governance systems that could perform this buffering function, using case study examples from Macubeni, Nqabara, Makuleke and Richtersveld to support our propositions. In our case studies, 11 strategies have been used to increase the incidence of success of CBNRM: understand and describe the social-ecological system; establish and communicate a clear vision; build on local organizations; plan ahead; create rules for resource use and enforce them; communicate the vision, plan and rules; develop management capacity; finance the initial stages of the initiative; work within available legal frameworks; monitor and learn all the time; and create lasting incentives. Despite these strategies there are, however, a number of obstinate implementation challenges, related to governance shortcomings and external factors which management cannot control. We therefore propose seven additional strategies to promote good governance in CBNRM: 1. Develop knowledge networks that draw on the experience and wisdom of a wide range of key individuals. 2. Establish formalised decision-making structures (e.g. multi-level project steering committees) with clear constitutions and codes of conduct. 3. Clearly define and legitimise conflict resolution procedures. 4. Ensure acceptance of the governance structure by community members. 5. Obtain formal commitment to well-defined roles and responsibilities by key individuals. 6. Establish tangible incentives to key individuals for meeting their commitments.

The “new pastoral commons” of Eastern and Southern Africa

“…This paradigm, often dubbed Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in the Southern African context, takes off from the Ostromian assumption (Ostrom 1990(Ostrom , 2002 that local communities are able to manage resources sustainably and in an equitable manner if a number of well-defined social and political conditions are fulfilled (e.g. Jones and Murphree 2001;Agrawal 2003;Fabricius and Collins 2007). Across Southern and Eastern Africa numerous well-funded CBNRM initiatives have transformed environmental governance in communal areas over recent decades (Fabricius et al 2004).…”

Social capital, community-based governance and resilience in an African artisanal river fishery

“…It also shows that social capital was the foundation for resilience enabling the people to resist efforts to introduce Christianity so that they retained their Muslim faith. Whilst in the past there may have existed a strong sense of 'community' sustained by social capital that enabled it to deal with differences and conflicts (the classic surprises of Fabricius and Collins, 2005) the evidence suggests that this is no longer the case. In the area of north Sanga, Anstey (2005:182) observes that governance has 'limited and varied local influence on either customary or state administration' and there is a 'chasm between formal and informal systems and general vacuum and suspicion of authority'.…”

“…In the area of north Sanga, Anstey (2005:182) observes that governance has 'limited and varied local influence on either customary or state administration' and there is a 'chasm between formal and informal systems and general vacuum and suspicion of authority'. While Fabricius and Collins (2005) have suggested that natural and social capital are commonly well represented in CBNRM initiatives, it may be justified to claim that in many instances such initiatives do not automatically enhance natural and social capital. On the other, it may be reasonable to contend that it is practically possible to re-establish natural and social capital in situations where they have both been depleted.…”

“…Fabricius and Collins (2005) draw attention to a number of 'classic surprises' that are associated with phases of discontinuous change in CBNRM. Among these are conflict (Koch, 2004), financial mismanagement (Robbins, 2000), and mismanagement of natural resources (Okello and Kiringi, 2004).…”

Community-based management of environmental challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean

“…There is evidence that these initiatives can promote long-endurance indigenous management systems, effective land and sea common pool resources management, and the devolution and recognition of existing community rights within sustainable CBNRM strategies (e.g., Ostrom 1990, Klooster 2000, Kamran and Shivakoti 2009. However, there have also been challenges of elite capture of benefits (Fabricius and Collins 2007), failures in governance and leadership (Bohensky and Lynam 2005), withdrawal of technical and financial support (Balint and Mashinya 2006), difficulties in replicating and scalingup approaches (White et al 2002), and inequitable distribution of benefits (Suich 2013). It is clear that understanding the context and the history, as well as the local and wider institutional dynamics that have shaped CBNRM (Kinzig et al 2013), and the community indicators of success and well-being (Znajda 2014), is critical for assessing the extent to which these CBNRM initiatives are able to deal with environmental challenges and support livelihoods.…”