Although there are strong theoretical reasons to regard optimal zoning and fiscal policies as simultaneous decisions, most empirical studies have focused on one type of decision or the other. Even fewer attempts have been made to study interdependencies between competing towns in their selection of zoning and fiscal policies. If these interdependencies are prevalent, autonomous local governments may pursue zoning, taxing, and spending policies that are locally rational but socially inefficient. In this study, an optimization model of the local economy is used to illustrate the nature of these interdependencies and to specify an appropriate empirical test. Data from 164 Connecticut townships are used to estimate the empirical model.This study seeks to extend the theoretical and empirical analyses of local government behavior by incorporating the simultaneity of zoning and fiscal decisions within a town, as well as the interdependence of such decisions among neighboring towns. Government decisions regarding land-use and the provision and financing of local public goods affect the welfare of households and the profitability of firms. Depending on the zoning mechanisms employed and the degree of restrictiveness, zoning can influence land rents and housing prices, population density patterns, environmental quality, transportation costs, and even labor markets. Similarly, local tax and expenditure decisions affect the locations and microeconomic choices of households and firms, and, hence, market outcomes within local and regional economies. Taken separately, or together, these local zoning and fiscal decisions are potentially quite important and have been studied extensively.The literature on the theoretical and empirical aspects of zoning is rich, and interest in the topic remains keen: in recent years, two key journals have devoted entire issues to land-use controls (The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, June 1990, and Land Economics, August 1990). A focus of theoretical studies has been the effects of zoning on land rents and housing prices. Ohls, Weisberg, and White (1974) show that aggregate land values are affected differentially by zoning, depending on the elasticities of demand in different submarkets. C ourant (1976) and Grieson and White (1981) demonstrate, respectively, that the effects of zoning on land values depend on whether the zoning is used by one municipality or throughout the metropolitan area, as well as on which particular zoning instrument is employed.