Comparative Pork Barrel Politics

Abstract

A growing literature exists on constituency service and pork barrel politics in the United States. Comparative research on an electoral connection between representatives and their constituents has been limited, generally confined to the British case. The research reported here takes an initial step in broadening comparative research on pork barrel politics beyond the American and British cases. Although a case study of the Federal Republic of Germany, this article maintains a strong comparative perspective through its analysis of different types of electoral systems - single- and multimember districts. Our analysis tests the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, single-member district systems possess stronger incentives than multimember districts for the distributive allocation of pork barrel projects. Through a close-ended mail questionnaire of representatives of the 1983-1986 German Bundestag, this research produces significant evidence to corroborate empirically this theoretical argument. We conclude that district type affects representatives' perceptions of pork barrel allocations as a special type of constituency service.

Political Recruitment Beyond Elections: An Exploration of the Linkage Between Patronage, Democracy, and Diversity in the United Kingdom

“…The great value of examining PasG is that it complements emerging research that rejects the default interpretation of patronage as a ‘bad’ thing but instead offers a more balanced approach that contextualizes the topic within the challenges of governing ‘disaffected democracies' (Pharr and Putnam 2000). PasG is explicitly conceptualized as a tool of good governance rather than as a form of corruption, and is therefore distinct from ‘pork barrel’ politics, which is based on the exploitation of government funds to garner support in specific electoral constituencies (Ferejohn 1973; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Lancaster and Paterson 1990). Its intention is not to secure the support of specific individuals, groups or constituencies within a polity, but to demonstrate a much broader governing competency and through this secure electoral support.…”

Campaign-Personalization and Constituency Focus in a Mixed-Member Electoral System. The Case of Hungary

“…One of the most frequently discussed characteristics of the single member majority systems is that they create a strong accountability linkage (Lancaster, 1986;Norris, 2000Norris, , 2004Scholl, 1986). Since a district has a single representative, the voters will be able to determine who to reward or punish for the positive or negative outcomes (Lancaster, 1986;Lancaster and Patterson, 1990;Norris, 2004). Conversely, in Multi-Member Districts (MMDs), the accountability link becomes blurred and the incentive to free-ride increases because there is a territorial overlap among the legislators (Heitshusen,Young,and 5 For instance representational attitudes, constituency service or work in parliament.…”

Legislative Effects of Electoral Mandates

“…9 Such contradictory findings have been reported even for the same country. 12 Lancaster and Patterson 1990;Stratmann andBaur 2002. 13 Our research design makes use of a different kind of controlled comparison offered by MMS but not exploited in previous studies -one that allows us to identify the effect of electoral rules on the voting behavior of legislators more rigorously.…”