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This article analyses the politics of performance management in the United Kingdom, focusing on the extent to which a highly centralised Westminster majoritarian polity has encouraged the top-down control of public services. It does so by comparing the approaches to performance management that prevailed under the Labour Governments (1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010) and the Coalition (2010-15) to demonstrate the degree of continuity that exists between the ostensibly divergent approaches that each sought to develop. It particular, the which has resulted in a burgeoning disconnect betweenPresenting the results of an extensive programme of original empirical research, this article is therefore of significance for theories of performance management, and illuminates the connection between macro--

The role of legislatures in scrutinising executive patronage has received scant attention in the context of parliamentary democracy. This article addresses this lacuna by focusing on the parliamentary scrutiny of public appointments in the United Kingdom. Presenting the results of an extensive programme of research, it reveals how select committees have accrued increasing powers to challenge ministerial appointments, and how this has resulted in a series of unintended consequences that raise critical concerns regarding the overall added-value of preappointment scrutiny. The article is therefore of comparative significance for theories of legislative scrutiny in particular and executive-legislature dynamics more broadly.

The UK is often regarded as the archetype of Westminster democracy and as the empirical antithesis of the power-sharing coalitions of Western Europe. Yet, in recent years a different account has emerged that focuses on the subtler institutional dynamics which limit the executive. It is to this body of scholarship that this article responds, locating the recent chapter of coalition government within the wider context of UK democratic evolution. To do so, the article draws L two-dimensional typology of democracies, developing a refined framework that enables systematic comparison over time. The article demonstrates that between over the course of the 2010-15 Parliament, the UK underwent another period of majoritarian modification, driven by factors including the long-term influence of the constitutional forces unleashed under Labour and the short-term impact of coalition management. The article makes several important contributions, salient in the UK and beyond. Theoretically, it offers a critical rejoinder to debates regarding the relationship between institutional design and democratic performance. Methodologically, it demonstrates that the tools of large-scale comparison can be effectively scaled-down to facilitate withincase analysis. Empirically, it provides a series of conclusions regarding the tenability of the UK subject.

Flowing out of wider debates regarding representative democracy, the diversity of political institutions has gained salience. Normatively, it is suggested that it is simply unfair for white, middle‐aged males to dominate decision‐making structures. Instead it has been argued that representative diversity can enhance the legitimacy of political institutions and processes, whilst improving the quality and inclusivity of policy‐making. Although most of these arguments have been applied to elected institutions and their bureaucracies, they are also germane in the context of appointments to the boards of public bodies, as the work of these bodies and the decisions made by their board members impacts upon the everyday lives of citizens. Drawing upon original research conducted in the UK, this article argues that the capacity of political actors to make appointments to public boards offers an as yet unrealized democratic potential by offering more opportunities for social engagement and participation in public governance.