Patterns of democracy: Coalition governance and majoritarian modification in the United Kingdom, 2010–2015

Abstract

The UK is often regarded as the archetype of Westminster democracy and as the empirical antithesis of the power-sharing coalitions of Western Europe. Yet, in recent years a different account has emerged that focuses on the subtler institutional dynamics which limit the executive. It is to this body of scholarship that this article responds, locating the recent chapter of coalition government within the wider context of UK democratic evolution. To do so, the article draws L two-dimensional typology of democracies, developing a refined framework that enables systematic comparison over time. The article demonstrates that between over the course of the 2010-15 Parliament, the UK underwent another period of majoritarian modification, driven by factors including the long-term influence of the constitutional forces unleashed under Labour and the short-term impact of coalition management. The article makes several important contributions, salient in the UK and beyond. Theoretically, it offers a critical rejoinder to debates regarding the relationship between institutional design and democratic performance. Methodologically, it demonstrates that the tools of large-scale comparison can be effectively scaled-down to facilitate withincase analysis. Empirically, it provides a series of conclusions regarding the tenability of the UK subject.

Who is in Control? Brexit and the Westminster Model

“…Additionally, legislative power is concentrated in the House of Commons, with recent reforms of the House of Lords arguably weakening the Upper House further. 3 Turning to the vertical distribution of powers (unitary versus federal), for a long time the UK's political system was an example of a unitary and centralised government. With the abolition of the Parliament of Northern Ireland in the early 1970s and the centralisation reforms of the second Thatcher government in the mid-1980s, the British system virtually coincided with the ideal-typical Westminster model.…”

Formal rules, informal norms and the everyday practice of coalition governance

“…Yet despite their prevalence, we know relatively little about the everyday practice of coalition governance. Secondly, and relatedly, some have regarded coalition as capacity for inclusive and consensual decision-making (notably Lijphart, 2012, but compare to Matthews, 2018;Matthews and Flinders, 2017). However, for such normative claims to substantiated, a clear understanding of the contextual conditions under which coalition governments operate is imperative.…”

The Westminster system under the Cameron coalition: ‘Promiscuous partisanship’ or institutional resilience?

“…As Matthews and Flinders (2017: 2) attest, 'the normative assumptions of Westminster majoritarianism had been qualified', by the outcome of the 2010 election; the coalition meant the Liberal Democrats sought to exercise a 'restraining effect' on Conservative ministers (Goes, 2016: 93). In coalitions, it is usually the case that, 'power is more dispersed and government policies arise from negotiations' (Gay et al, 2016: 119).…”