2017
DOI: 10.1177/0952076717737595
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The Westminster system under the Cameron coalition: ‘Promiscuous partisanship’ or institutional resilience?

Abstract: This article applies Aucoin's paradigm of New Political Governance derived from the comparative literature on Westminster systems to review changes in the UK machinery of government during the Coalition era from 2010 to 2015. The paper examines whether coalition government imposed 'checks and balances' that prevented Conservative ministers from enacting a further wave of New Public Management-style reforms of the permanent bureaucracy comparable to New Political Governance. The central argument of the article … Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…The ally principle also promotes the aligning of preferences between the minister and bureaucrats. A relatively recent trend in research has argued that principle-agent problems can be potentially mitigated through government usage of ex ante screening instruments, such as the power to appoint top civil servants, which reduces agency losses and ensures the agents' responsiveness towards governments' policy preferences (Diamond, 2017). Therefore, a new standard principle needs to be equated: BC.…”
Section: Principles Of Delegationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The ally principle also promotes the aligning of preferences between the minister and bureaucrats. A relatively recent trend in research has argued that principle-agent problems can be potentially mitigated through government usage of ex ante screening instruments, such as the power to appoint top civil servants, which reduces agency losses and ensures the agents' responsiveness towards governments' policy preferences (Diamond, 2017). Therefore, a new standard principle needs to be equated: BC.…”
Section: Principles Of Delegationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Research should consider this study alongside studies showing a continued presence of impartiality among senior officials (Alford et al ., 2017; Diamond, 2019; Grube and Howard, 2016). One possible interpretation of this article vis-à-vis such contrasting studies, which future research should explore, is whether underlying pressures inducing promiscuous partisanship are becoming stronger, or perhaps, whether promiscuous partisanship might be more ephemeral, arising when the right set of contingencies are in place and upsetting what is otherwise an environment of impartiality.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet, today’s bureaucracies might not be as nightmarish as Aucoin depicts. To date, the evidentiary record has led many scholars to dismiss NPG as empirically inaccurate (Grube and Howard, 2016; Boston and Nethercote, 2012; Lindquist and Rasmussen, 2012; Diamond, 2019). This article contributes to this research by examining a case study from Canada of the SNC-Lavalin affair to identify whether the loyalty displayed by the senior most public servant—the Clerk of the Privy Council (the Clerk)—during a highly publicized parliamentary committee reflects impartiality or promiscuous partisanship.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…More recently, a MHCLG official noted that the task of persuading reluctant departments to get involved had been made more challenging due to the fact this 'this Prime Minister is not as pro devolution as her predecessor so devolution for devolution's sake is no longer on the agenda'. This demonstrates how the formal state apparatus -or institutional Westminster resiliencesignificantly shaped the environment for doing business (Diamond, 2019). The first round of devolution deals in 2015 were shaped by a very particular set of factors that made a high degree of informality possible -i.e.…”
Section: Resistance: How Has Central and Local Resistance Shaped The mentioning
confidence: 97%
“…First, the historical and enduring legacy of the Westminster model undoubtedly shaped the ruling of senior civil servants charged with managing devolution (Diamond, 2019). High profile Ministers were instrumental in shaping the scope and direction of the policy and for sanctioning civil servants to go 'off script' and adopt more informal and relational approaches to managing central-local relationships.…”
Section: Part V Conclusionmentioning
confidence: 99%