Comparing Strategic Voting Under FPTP and PR

Abstract

Based on recent work that suggests that voters in proportional representation (PR) systems have incentives to cast strategic votes, the authors hypothesize that levels of strategic voting are similar in both first-past-the-post (FPTP) and PR systems. Comparing vote intentions in majoritarian elections in the United States, Mexico, Britain, and Israel to PR elections in Israel and the Netherlands, the authors find that a substantial proportion of the voters desert their most preferred candidate or party and that patterns of strategic voting across FPTP and PR bear striking similarities. In every election, smaller parties tend to lose votes to major parties. Because there tend to be more small parties in PR systems, tactical voting is actually more common under PR than under FPTP. The findings suggest that whatever the electoral system, voters focus on the policy consequences of their behavior and which parties are likely to influence policy outcomes following the election.

The Effects of District Magnitude on Voting Behavior

“…This argument is similar to a claim made by Sartori (1968, 279) much earlier: "The general rule is that the progression from maximal manipulative impact [via strategic voting] to sheer ineffectiveness follows, more than anything else, the size of the constituency." However, there is some observational research which suggests that we should observe similar proportions of strategic voting under proportional representation and single-member districts (Abramson et al 2010). We investigate the effect of DM on voting behavior via a laboratory experiment designed to isolate the motivations behind voter choices.…”

Vote stratégique au Québec : analyse de l’élection de 2012

“…Il est également important de mentionner que le vote straté-gique se manifeste dans tous les modes de scrutin, même si la littérature s'est davantage penchée sur les systèmes majoritaires. Non seulement se manifeste-t-il dans tous les modes de scrutin, mais ce comportement se présente dans une proportion similaire (Abramson et al, 2010). Par exemple, Thomas Gschwend (2007) relève 6 % de votes stratégiques en Allemagne, système proportionnel mixte 2 .…”

Electoral System and Number of Candidates: Candidate Entry Under Plurality and Majority Runoff

“…There are more competing candidates under majority runoff because fewer voters engage in strategic voting under this electoral system. Observational and experimental 2 studies show that the type and proportion of strategic voting differ somewhat in plurality and majority runoff systems (Abramson et al 2010;Blais et al 2011;Van der Straeten et al 2010). Optimal strategic voting under majority runoff requires more complex strategies than the bare desertion of non--viable candidates.…”

“…Duverger (1951) argues that the difference is due to voting behaviour, as, he says, there are more strategic voters in plurality than in majority runoff elections. However, recent studies show that voters engage in strategic voting to almost the same extent under both electoral systems (Abramson et al 2010;Blais et al 2011; Van der Straeten et al 2010). Thus, the difference should be due to another factor.…”