The Effects of District Magnitude on Voting Behavior

Hix, Simon; Hortalà-Vallvé, Rafael; Riambau, Guillem

doi:10.1086/688889

Cited by 21 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Strategic behavior seems to be modest. This is in line with previous findings that suggest that strategic behavior is not predominant among voters (Abramson et al, 2010;Alvarez et al, 2006;Blais et al, 2016;Hix et al, 2017;Riambau, 2016). 4 This could be explained by a variety of factors.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 92%

Māori in New Zealand: Voting with Their Feet?

Riambau

2018

SSRN Journal

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 92%

Māori in New Zealand: Voting with Their Feet?

Riambau

2018

SSRN Journal

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“…Kedar (2009) and Duch et al (2010) have measured the proportion of party versus policy voting and found large proportions of each across countries. 1 A policy versus party model, however, neglects that there is substantial evidence of other types of motivations: bandwagon behaviour (voting for the expected winner) has been observed both in experimental settings (Hix et al, 2017; Morton and Ou, 2015) and in actual elections (Meffert et al, 2011). ‘Protest’ (Damore et al, 2012) or ‘punishing’ (Hix and Marsh, 2007) is other example of strategies that voters have been found to use.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do citizens vote for parties, policies or the expected winner in proportional representation systems? Evidence from four different countries using a multiple-type model

Riambau

2016

Party Politics

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This article presents a unified framework that allows us to disentangle to what extent agents in proportional representation (PR) systems engage in the different strategies that the available voting models have separately suggested: ‘party’, ‘coalitional’, ‘bandwagon’ and ‘other’ voting (i.e. neither of the previous three). Results using data from multiple countries reveal that at least 75% of agents cast a sincere party vote. Around 10% of voters try to affect policymaking by casting a coalitional vote. Since most coalitional agents use their vote to ‘push’ coalitions away from the centre, extreme parties are the most benefited. Hence, strategic coalitional voting may increase rather than preclude fragmentation of a party system in PR contexts. Another 5% of voters support the expected winner regardless of their own party and coalition preferences. Finally, 5–10% of voters fall into the category of other types. The characteristics and motivations of each type are uncovered. Political sophistication increases the likelihood of sincere and coalitional voting. On the other hand, dissatisfaction with parties voted for in the past increases other voting. In particular, recent growth of European right-wing nationalist parties is shown to rely more on other voting and less on sincere and coalitional support.

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“…But, because so many factors vary between countries in addition to the electoral rules, such as changes in the number and sizes of parties, these patterns cannot be interpreted causally. Responding to this constraint, laboratory studies have tried to isolate the causal effect of electoral rules on voting behavior and strategic coordination (for example, Hix, Hortala-Vallve and Riambau-Armet 2017;St-Vincent, Blais and Pilet 2016).…”

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confidence: 99%

Electoral Reform and Strategic Coordination

Fiva

Hix

2020

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Electoral reform creates new strategic coordination incentives for voters and elites, but endogeneity problems make such effects hard to identify. This article addresses this issue by investigating an extraordinary dataset, from the introduction of proportional representation (PR) in Norway in 1919, which permits the measurement of parties’ vote shares in pre-reform single-member districts and in the same geographic units in the post-reform multi-member districts. The electoral reform had an immediate effect on the fragmentation of the party system, due in part to strategic party entry. The authors find, though, that another main effect of the reform was that many voters switched between existing parties, particularly between the Liberals and Conservatives, as the incentives for these voters to coordinate against Labor were removed by the introduction of PR.

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The Effects of District Magnitude on Voting Behavior

Cited by 21 publications

References 14 publications

Māori in New Zealand: Voting with Their Feet?

Māori in New Zealand: Voting with Their Feet?

Do citizens vote for parties, policies or the expected winner in proportional representation systems? Evidence from four different countries using a multiple-type model

Electoral Reform and Strategic Coordination

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