2020
DOI: 10.1017/s0007123419000747
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Electoral Reform and Strategic Coordination

Abstract: Electoral reform creates new strategic coordination incentives for voters and elites, but endogeneity problems make such effects hard to identify. This article addresses this issue by investigating an extraordinary dataset, from the introduction of proportional representation (PR) in Norway in 1919, which permits the measurement of parties’ vote shares in pre-reform single-member districts and in the same geographic units in the post-reform multi-member districts. The electoral reform had an immediate effect o… Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…The substantive impact of the reform is consistent with existing theory (Cox 1997) and experimental evidence (Hix, Hortala-Vallve and Riambau-Armet 2017) showing that introducing a PR system substantively relaxes the incentives of voters and elites to coordinate on one of the two previously dominant parties. It is also well aligned with evidence from an electoral reform in Norway showing that the introduction of PR reduced voter coordination against the Labour Party (Fiva and Hix 2021).…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 72%
“…The substantive impact of the reform is consistent with existing theory (Cox 1997) and experimental evidence (Hix, Hortala-Vallve and Riambau-Armet 2017) showing that introducing a PR system substantively relaxes the incentives of voters and elites to coordinate on one of the two previously dominant parties. It is also well aligned with evidence from an electoral reform in Norway showing that the introduction of PR reduced voter coordination against the Labour Party (Fiva and Hix 2021).…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 72%
“…But more importantly, parties and voters are more likely to take advantage of secondary mobilization in PR than in SMDs. In PR, more parties typically emerge and those parties typically occupy distinct ideological positions (Fiva and Hix 2021). This enhances secondary mobilization in strongholds in PR for two main reasons.…”
Section: Electoral Systemsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The question we address in this article is why electoral reforms affect the (re)distribution of seats among parties in the short-term, but do not affect the (re)distribution of votes. This is a relevant question because the effect of electoral systems (and electoral reforms) depend on the interplay among the mechanical and psychological effects (Fiva and Hix, 2021) and, even more importantly, because electoral reforms are mainly a short-term phenomenon: data from Renwick (2010Renwick ( , 2011 show that when an electoral reform is adopted, it is quite likely than it will be followed by another one a few years later.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If they anticipate the mechanical impact of the new electoral systems and behave differently in the first post-reform election in comparison with the last pre-reform election, the distribution of votes among parties would change. When an electoral reform increases (decreases) permissiveness, the interplay among the mechanical and psychological effects should lead to an expected increase (decrease) in the number of parties (Fiva and Hix, 2021). Most of the empirical evidence from different regions and time periods, however, does not support this expectation about the psychological effect of electoral reforms.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%