Researchers in comparative research increasingly use multilevel models to test effects of country‐level factors on individual behavior and preferences. However, the asymptotic justification of widely employed estimation strategies presumes large samples and applications in comparative politics routinely involve only a small number of countries. Thus, researchers and reviewers often wonder if these models are applicable at all. In other words, how many countries do we need for multilevel modeling? I present results from a large‐scale Monte Carlo experiment comparing the performance of multilevel models when few countries are available. I find that maximum likelihood estimates and confidence intervals can be severely biased, especially in models including cross‐level interactions. In contrast, the Bayesian approach proves to be far more robust and yields considerably more conservative tests.

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Why is the difference in redistribution preferences between the rich and the poor high in some countries and low in others? In this article, we argue that it has a lot to do with the rich and very little to do with the poor. We contend that while there is a general relative income effect on redistribution preferences, the preferences of the rich are highly dependent on the macrolevel of inequality. The reason for this effect is not related to immediate tax and transfer considerations but to a negative externality of inequality: crime. We will show that the rich in more unequal regions in Western Europe are more supportive of redistribution than the rich in more equal regions because of their concern with crime. In making these distinctions between the poor and the rich, the arguments in this article challenge some influential approaches to the politics of inequality.

Researchers in comparative research are increasingly relying on individual level data to test theories involving unobservable constructs like attitudes and preferences. Estimation is carried out using large-scale cross-national survey data providing responses from individuals living in widely varying contexts. This strategy rests on the assumption of equivalence, i.e. that no systematic distortion in response behavior of individuals from different countries exists. However this assumption is frequently violated with rather grave consequences for comparability and interpretation. I present a Multilevel Mixture Ordinal Item Response Model with Item-bias Effects that is able to establish equivalence. It corrects for systematic measurement error induced by unobserved country heterogeneity and it allows for the simultaneous estimation of structural parameters of interest. * I am indebted to Thomas Gschwend, Jeff Gill, Tom Scotto, Michael Becher, Sven-Oliver Proksch, Anja Neundorf, Jim Stimson, Ray Dutch, Christian Arnold, my editor Michael Alvarez, and three anonymous reviewers for constructive comments and suggestions. As usual, all remaining errors and deficiencies are mine.

Why is the difference in redistribution preferences between the rich and the poor high in some places and low in others? In this paper we argue that it has a lot to do with the rich and very little to do with the poor. We contend that while there is a general relative income effect on redistribution preferences, the preferences of the rich are highly dependent on the macro-level of inequality. The reason for this effect is not related to immediate tax and transfer considerations but to other-regarding concerns. Altruism is an important omitted variable in much of the Political Economy literature. While material self-interest is the base of most approaches to redistribution (first affecting preferences and then politics and policy), there is a paucity of research on other-regarding concerns. Using data for the US from 1978 to 2010, we show that the rich in more unequal states are more supportive of redistribution than the rich in more equal states. In making these distinctions between the poor and the rich, the arguments in this paper challenge some influential approaches to the politics of inequality.