Comparing the Strength of Nations

Kugler, Jacek; Domke, William K.

doi:10.1177/0010414086019001002

Cited by 93 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Other research casts doubt on this conclusion. Examining major power participation in the global wars of the twentieth century (Russo‐Japanese, WWI and WWII), Kugler and Domke () find no relationship between a state's form of government and the material resources allocated to waging war. In their analysis of democratic success in interstate wars, Reiter and Stam () fail to find a significant relationship between regime type and a country's defense burden in the population of war participants between 1816 and 1990.…”

Section: The Influence Of Regime Type and Interstate War On Governmenmentioning

confidence: 99%

Keeping the Schools Open While the Troops are Away: Regime Type, Interstate War, and Government Spending

Carter

Palmer

2014

Int Stud Q

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How and why do regime type and interstate war affect government spending? We argue that a political leader allocates scarce resources between social and military expenditures as a function of their relative efficiency in securing her political survival. We derive four hypotheses concerning how mobilization for and demobilization from interstate war affects government spending differently in democratic and autocratic regimes. Compared to democracies, autocracies should increase military spending to a greater degree during wartime and decrease military spending to a greater extent following a war. Autocracies also should cut social spending more during an interstate war and increase social spending more during the process of demobilization from war than democracies. Our analyses of all states in the international system from 1950 to 2001 yield support for our hypotheses.How a government distributes its resources is a function of political institutions, internal and external environmental factors, and the policy preferences of its leadership (Jones,

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Section: The Influence Of Regime Type and Interstate War On Governmenmentioning

confidence: 99%

Keeping the Schools Open While the Troops are Away: Regime Type, Interstate War, and Government Spending

Carter

Palmer

2014

Int Stud Q

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“…Political scientists have employed this tax effort index as a measure of the political capacity of the governmen? (Organski and Kugler 1978) and have used it to explain the outcome of wars (Kugler and Domke 1986) or the evolution of the external debt of developing countries (Snider 1988(Snider , 1990. Surprisingly, none of these studies has ever tried to explain the value of the tax effort index or, more simply, to identify factors that, beside economic ones, can explain tax shares in developing countries.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Political and Tax Capacity of Government in Developing Countries

Fauvelle-Aymar¹

1999

Kyklos

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“…During World War I, Austria–Hungary added little to German capability, except initially on the Eastern Front. By way of contrast, without Great Britain, France (even with Italy) was no match for Germany on the Western Front (Kugler and Domke 1986:60–63). In other words, abstracting away some of the particulars of the July crisis, it is highly doubtful that Germany would have backed away from a war with France in 1914 simply because it lacked support from Austria.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Deterrence-Versus-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence: Explaining British Policy in 1914

Zagare

Kilgour

2006

Int Studies Review

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This essay explores the deterrence‐versus‐restraint dilemma in extended deterrence in the context of the Tripartite Crisis Game under incomplete information. This model was developed specifically to capture the mixed motives and contradictory impulses that oftentimes frame extended deterrence encounters. To focus the analysis and to gain tractability, we make specific assumptions about the utilities of the players: Challenger, Defender, and Protégé. Our most significant simplification concerns Defender's type. In particular, we assume that Defender, although not heavily invested in the issues in dispute, is known to prefer conflict to the breakup of its strategic relationship with Protégé. One important result concerns unequivocal commitments. We find that such commitments are efficacious but only when Protégé's threat to sever its relationship with Defender is highly credible. In the absence of this condition, a straddle (or mixed) strategy is optimal for Defender. A straddle strategy, which involves probabilistic support of Protégé, is the mechanism by which Defender attempts to resolve the deterrence‐versus‐restraint dilemma. Sometimes, the stratagem works and Challenger is deterred and Protégé is restrained. But a straddle strategy will always fail to deter determined Challengers, such as Germany in 1914, that prefer to fight rather than back down during a confrontation. It may even fail to deter hesitant Challengers with an aversion to conflict. We use these insights to explain and evaluate British policy in the runup to World War I.

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Comparing the Strength of Nations

Cited by 93 publications

References 7 publications

Keeping the Schools Open While the Troops are Away: Regime Type, Interstate War, and Government Spending

Keeping the Schools Open While the Troops are Away: Regime Type, Interstate War, and Government Spending

The Political and Tax Capacity of Government in Developing Countries

The Deterrence-Versus-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence: Explaining British Policy in 1914

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