“…Also, during this period many criticisms are granted to the BQ because of the serious limits it has shown as a mechanism normally responsible for developing control procedures to manage the various risk situations to which the bank could be exposed. However, most of the studies that have compared the conventional banks (CBs) and Islamic banks' (IBs) FP have either generated mixed and inconclusive results (Samad, 1999;Ariss, 2010;Loghod, 2011;Jaffar and Manarvi, 2011;Masruki et al, 2011;Siraj and Pillai, 2012;Ansari and Rehman, 2012;Srairi, 2013;Kakakhel et al, 2013;Elsiefy, 2013;Saeed et al, 2013;Onakoya and Onakoya, 2013;Aziz et al, 2016;Majeed and Zanib, 2016;Mukhibad and Khafid, 2018), either they have favored one type over the other (Haron, 1996;Iqbal, 2001;Rosly and Bakar, 2003;Hassan, 2006;Mokhtar et al, 2008;Bader et al, 2008;Srairi, 2010;Usman and Khan, 2012;Rahim et al, 2013;Beck et al, 2013;Rosman et al, 2014;Tlemsani and Suwaidi, 2016;Bahrini, 2017;Ledhem and Mekidiche, 2020), or they have stated that there are no differences between CBs and IBs (Widagdo and Ika, 2008;Shamsu Uddin et al, 2017), depending on the study's context and conditions (Rahim et al, 2013). Moreover, one of the reasons of the sudden CBs and/or IBs' bankruptcy and the unexpected appearance of financial crises, especially the Subprime crisis, is the weaknesses in the governance quality despite the risk study, especially in the banks' BQ.…”