Competition between Specialized Candidates

Abstract

We develop a formal model in which the government provides public goods in different policy fields for its citizens. We start from the basic premise that two office-motivated candidates have differential capabilities in different policy fields, and compete by proposing how to allocate government resources to those fields. The model has a unique equilibrium that differs substantially from the standard median-voter model. While candidates compete for the support of a moderate voter type, this cutoff voter differs from the expected median voter. Moreover, no voter type except the cutoff voter is indifferent between the candidates in equilibrium. The model also predicts that candidates respond to changes in the preferences of voters in a very rigid way. We also analyze under which conditions candidates choose to strengthen the issue in which they have a competence advantage, and when they rather compensate for their weakness. JEL-Code: D72.

Intensity valence

“…Various models wherein candidates maximize the probability of winning consider that the median voter position is unkown (but candidates share a common subjective probability on it). This is the case with some models with non-UCR preferences, like Soubeyran (2009) and Krasa and Polborn (2010) as noticed in Sect. 2, as well as some models with additive valence (e.g., Aragonès and Xefteris 2012;Hummel 2010).…”

“…Our model is one of the few papers in the literature on voting wherein voters are endowed with non-UCR preferences. These few papers include in particular Krasa and Polborn (2010), Soubeyran (2009), Miller (2011), and Kartik and McAfee (2007. Krasa and Polborn (2010), like Soubeyran (2009), consider two office-motivated candidates who propose to allocate a fixed budget between two public goods; they have unequal abilities to implement these goods, and the median voter position is unknown.…”

“…These few papers include in particular Krasa and Polborn (2010), Soubeyran (2009), Miller (2011), and Kartik and McAfee (2007. Krasa and Polborn (2010), like Soubeyran (2009), consider two office-motivated candidates who propose to allocate a fixed budget between two public goods; they have unequal abilities to implement these goods, and the median voter position is unknown. 5 In their model, ability differentials give rise to non-UCR preferences, like in our model.…”

Divide and rule: redistribution in a model with differentiated candidates

“…We name those two dimensions non-economic characteristics and redistribution, respectively. Following the literature of electoral competition between differentiated candidates (Krasa and Polborn 2010a, 2014aDziubiński and Roy 2011), we assume that the two candidates have fixed non-economic characteristics, while in the second dimension they strategically choose a redistribution scheme to maximize expected vote shares. We, moreover, consider a unit mass of heterogeneous voters that differ both in terms of their non-economic characteristics and also in terms of their incomes.…”

Social Ideology and Taxes in a Differentiated Candidates Framework

“…Our model is based on the general differentiated candidates framework developed in Krasa and Polborn (2009a, 2010b, 2010a, in which the two competing candidates have some characteristics that cannot be changed, but choose a position (or "policy") in order to maximize their respective probability of winning. Voters' utility depends on both fixed characteristics and flexible policies.…”