Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of 'Per se Rules vs. Rule of Reason'

Christiansen, Arndt; Kerber, Wolfgang

doi:10.2139/ssrn.872694

Cited by 18 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…11 For instance, the FTC-DOJ merger guidelines use safe harbors for small market shares. Alternatively, Christiansen and Kerber (2006) propose modified or structured rules of reason. In a different context, Demougin and Fluet (2008) suggest burden of proof guidelines.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legal Uncertainty as a Welfare Enhancing Screen

Lang

2016

SSRN Journal

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legal Uncertainty as a Welfare Enhancing Screen

Lang

2016

SSRN Journal

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“…A typical competition law is thus a per se prohibition of collusion/price fixing, rather than a form of abuse principle, which would forbid anti-competitive behaviour only if it leads to undesirable results, for example, high prices. It can sometimes be difficult to know which of these two extremes best describes an actual law (see Christiansen and Kerber 2006), and therefore in cases of doubt we have included more than one date (e.g., for Denmark and Austria). This is also done when sources explicitly indicate that an early competition law was not enforced.…”

Section: Appendixmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade costs and the timing of competition policy adoption

Forslid

Häckner

Muren

2011

Canadian J of Economics

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This paper first presents stylized evidence showing how the date of the adoption of competition policy is correlated with country size. Smaller countries tend to adopt competition policy later. We then present a theoretical model with countries of different size, trade costs, and firms competingà la Cournot. In the model we show that reduced trade costs following from increasing globalization affect countries differently depending on their size. This has implications for the incentives to introduce competition policy. The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical regularity presented. JEL classification: F12, F15, F21, R12Coûts du commerce et le moment choisi pour adopter une politique de concurrence. Ce mémoire présente certains résultats qui suggèrent comment le moment choisi pour adopter une politique de concurrence est co-reliéà la taille du pays. Les petits pays tendentà adopter des politiques de concurrence plus tard. On présente un modèle théorique avec des pays de tailles différentes, qui ont aussi des coûts de commerce différents, et où les firmes se concurrencentà la Cournot. On montre que la réduction des coûts de commerce qui suit une mondialisation croissante affecte les pays d'une manière différente selon leur taille. Cela a des implications pour les incitationsà mettre en place une politique de concurrence. Les prédictions du modèle sont consistantes avec les régularités empiriques observées.

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“… 10 See also Beckner and Salop [1999], Tom and Pak [2000], Joskow [2002], and related analyses on legal standards, enforcement procedures and applications by Evans and Padilla [2004, 2005], Hylton and Salinger [2001], Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla [2005], A. Christiansen and W. Kerber [2006], Salinger [2006]. Immordino and Polo [2008] and Sørgard [2009] also consider deterrence effects. …”

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ON OPTIMAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR COMPETITION POLICY: A GENERAL WELFARE‐BASED ANALYSIS^*

Katsoulacos

Ulph

2009

The J Industrial Economics

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We present a new welfare-based framework for optimally choosing legal standards (decision rules). We formalise the decision-theoretic considerations widely discussed in the existing literature by capturing the quality of the underlying analysis and information available to a regulatory authority, and we obtain a precise necessary and sufficient set of conditions for determining when an Economics or Effects-Based approach would be able to discriminate effectively between benign and harmful actions and consequently dominate per se as a decision-making procedure. We then show that in a full welfare-based approach, the choice between legal standards must additionally take into account, (i) indirect (deterrence) effects of the choice of standard on the behaviour of all firms when deciding whether or not to adopt a particular practice; and (ii) procedural effects of certain features of the administrative process in particular delays in reaching decisions; and the investigation of only a fraction of the actions taking place. We therefore derive necessary and sufficient conditions for adopting Discriminating Rules, as advocated by the Effects-Based approach. We also examine what type of Discriminating rule will be optimal under different conditions that characterise different business practices. We apply our framework to two recent landmark decisions -Microsoft vs. EU Commission (2007) and Leegin vs. PSKS (2007) -in which a change in legal standards has been proposed, and show that it can powerfully clarify and enhance the arguments deployed in these cases.

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Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of 'Per se Rules vs. Rule of Reason'

Cited by 18 publications

References 39 publications

Legal Uncertainty as a Welfare Enhancing Screen

Legal Uncertainty as a Welfare Enhancing Screen

Trade costs and the timing of competition policy adoption

ON OPTIMAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR COMPETITION POLICY: A GENERAL WELFARE‐BASED ANALYSIS^*

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Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of 'Per se Rules vs. Rule of Reason'

Cited by 18 publications

References 39 publications

Legal Uncertainty as a Welfare Enhancing Screen

Legal Uncertainty as a Welfare Enhancing Screen

Trade costs and the timing of competition policy adoption

ON OPTIMAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR COMPETITION POLICY: A GENERAL WELFARE‐BASED ANALYSIS*

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ON OPTIMAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR COMPETITION POLICY: A GENERAL WELFARE‐BASED ANALYSIS^*