Competition Theory and Channeling Explanation

Abstract

The complexity and heterogeneity of causes influencing ecology's domain challenge its capacity to generate a general theory without exceptions, raising the question of whether ecology is capable, even in principle, of achieving the sort of theoretical success enjoyed by physics. Weber has argued that competition theory built around the Competitive Exclusion Principle (especially Tilman's resource-competition model) offers an example of ecology identifying a law-like causal regularity. However, I suggest that as Weber presents it, the CEP is not yet a causal regularity. Instead, I argue that the scientific understanding in Tilman's theory takes a different form. The theory explains through a structure I call "channeling explanation" which does not depend on deduction from general laws, but rather builds on constraints and trade-offs represented in state-space. Recognizing this structure supports the more general point that ecology and other so-called special sciences can reveal novel theoretical approaches to philosophy of science when approached with openness to their uniqueness.

Exclusions, Explanations, and Exceptions: On the Causal and Lawlike Status of the Competitive Exclusion Principle

“…Rather than being an explanans, the CEP acts as a contrastive principle sharpening causal explanations. These results contrast with previous analyses of the CEP by Eliot (2011) andWeber (1999), which are also discussed. As a more general conclusion, we suggest that accounts of causal explanation in biology have neglected some of the roles that non-causal laws play in restricting, sharpening, and facilitating causal explanations.…”

“…Weber (1999) and Eliot (2011) did not explicitly distinguish between apparent and genuine exceptions, but spoke vaguely of the CEP as being riddled with exceptions. Weber's idea seemed to be that the exceptions were apparent ones, whereas Eliot seemed to think that the CEP was riddled with unsystematic and unexplainable exceptions, i.e., genuine exceptions.…”

“…The CEP has been argued to be a tautology, a ceteris paribus law, a causal regularity, an analytical statement, and so on. Recently, Eliot (2011) suggested that the CEP should not be interpreted as a lawlike regularity nor as a causal regularity, in contrast to Weber (1999), who suggested that the CEP be considered a causal ceteris paribus law, the reason being that, according to Eliot, the principle is riddled with exceptions which are unexplainable. We review the positions taken by Eliot and Weber by arguing that the CEP can be interpreted as a strict coexistence law, one not riddled with exceptions, contrary to the opinions of both Weber and Eliot. We proceed as follows.…”

“…In addition, issues concerning the explanatory power of lower-and higher-level explanantia of exceptions to the CEP are discussed. Eliot (2011) suggested that there is a novel non-nomothetic mode of explanation, called channeling explanation, that functions in competition theory. In section 6, we offer a reconstruction of Eliot's channeling explanation by showing how it is compatible with an account of causal explanation, in which both explanandum and explanans are contrastive.…”

“…It is a strict law in disguise, which is not riddled with genuine exceptions, but same-level explainable apparent exceptions, suggesting that the principle may even be universally true. Eliot (2011) criticized Weber (1999 as being too optimistic in thinking that ecologists have theoretical resources to explain away the exceptions to the CEP: "But … that we anticipate in advance some exceptions or domain restrictions is beside the point; if we are interested in lawfulness …, we want to know whether all the limitations on the CEP can be specified in advance. Otherwise it is a classically problematic ceteris paribus generalization" (Eliot 2011: 6; original emphasis).…”