Complexity and implications on channel conflict under the uncertain impacts of online customer reviews

Guo, Zhanbing

doi:10.1007/s11071-019-04898-7

Cited by 19 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Moreover, some scholars have conducted research on channel conflicts in different scenarios. For example, Soysal et al [9], Du et al [10], Guo [11] and Yu et al [2] consider how consumers preferences affect channel conflicts in a dual-channel structure supply chain. He et al [12] consider a closed-loop supply chain with dual channels subsidized by government.…”

Section: A Channel Conflictsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing Strategies in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain With Sales Efforts and Channel Conflicts

Cai

Song

2020

IEEE Access

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With the increasing popularity of online retail, many manufacturers have opened up their own online marketplaces, which has accelerated competition in the retail market. This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer and the manufacturer sell the same product on their respective online platforms. This sales model creates channel conflicts in the supply chain. In order to explore the impact of this kind of conflict and sales efforts on the supply chain, we constructed consumers' utility functions when they buy products in different channels as well as a supply chain profit model where there is channel competition and sales efforts. The results show that the severity of channel conflicts affects consumers' choice of purchasing channels, and excessive channel conflicts will cause consumers to lose interest in shopping, channel conflicts will also make retailers and manufacturers more competitive. In addition, sales efforts can increase channel conflicts. Numerical analysis shows that although channel conflicts weaken the overall profit of the supply chain, it is more beneficial to manufacturers. Finally, we analyze the impact of channel conflicts and sales efforts on consumer surplus. We generate results to provide guidance for the operations of two-echelon supply chains. INDEX TERMS Channel conflicts, pricing strategies, sales efforts, two-echelon supply chain.

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Section: A Channel Conflictsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing Strategies in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain With Sales Efforts and Channel Conflicts

Cai

Song

2020

IEEE Access

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“…In traditional game theory, it is often assumed that participants are bounded rational and that participants are fully informed; however, the problem of incomplete information and bounded rationality is evident due to the complexity of the economic environment [19]. Evolutionary game is studied with a bounded rational group of participants [20][21][22][23][24][25][26]. In the continuous dynamic gaming, the lowyield strategy choice is constantly eliminated by the highyield strategy choice; after repeated gaming, elimination, and choice, the gaming parties achieve stability at the relative maximum benefit [27].…”

Section: Evolutionary Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Complex Dynamic Analysis for Game Model under Different Regulatory Levels in China’s Housing Rental Market

Qin

Yuan

et al. 2020

Complexity

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In this paper, we construct an evolutionary game model of government and real estate operators (long-term apartment rental companies) in the housing rental market in the context of financial institutions and public participation in regulation and analyze the effects of different regulatory levels of financial institutions and the public on the evolutionary results through model solving and numerical simulation. The results show that, under five different levels of supervision, financial institutions and the public have different evolutionary and stable strategies; financial institutions’ participation in supervision can effectively reduce the cost of government supervision and promote the government’s evolution towards strict supervision. It is difficult for real estate operators to evolve naturally towards keeping their promises when the probability of the social public or financial institutions participating in regulation is low. Only when the probability of social public and financial institutions participating in regulation reaches a certain level will real estate operators be inclined to keep their promises.

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“…It can be concluded that a lower adjustment speed of the ODM makes the system more stable, and the equilibrium gradually loses its stability and even reaches chaos as this adjustment speed increases. Figure 4 shows the LLE with respect to the adjustment speed β d corresponding to the bifurcation diagrams in Figure 3, where LLE is also an indicator to inspect the set of parameters that makes trajectory converge to periodic orbit, quasiperiodic, and chaotic attractor over time [19,26]. With the increase in β d , the evolution of the system becomes more and more complex.…”

Section: Analysis Of Dynamicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Zhang and Wang [25] examined two dynamic pricing strategies in a dualchannel supply chain with considering service value and focused on the effect of service value on decisions and an insight into complexity. Guo [26] investigated the channel conflict represented by a dynamic competition between online retailers and traditional retailers and discussed the impact of online customer reviews in a dual-channel supply chain from a dynamic perspective. Bischi et al [27] studied the evolutionary dynamics in club goods binary games with social influence.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Dynamic Cournot Game in a Coopetition Supply Chain

Mai

Zhang

Sun

2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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In the original manufacturing industry, upstream encroachment has become a universal commercial phenomenon. This paper considers a coopetition supply chain consisting of an upstream original design manufacturer (ODM) and a downstream original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and proposes a dynamic Cournot game under bounded rationality. To cope with a dynamic repeated game in discrete time, a gradient adjustment mechanism is adopted. Furthermore, bifurcation diagram, largest Lyapunov exponent, basin of attraction, and critical curve are introduced to investigate the dynamic behavior of this game. The results obtained show that as the firms’ policy adjustment speeds increase, the stability region of the dynamic system gradually narrows, but one special finding is that the complex behavior of the dynamic system is alleviated as the OEM’s adjustment speed greatly increases. Moreover, when the difference between the two firms’ adjustment speeds is relatively small, the dynamic adjustment strategy is beneficial to the coopetition supply chain and both firms under certain adjustment speeds, as compared to a one-shot game. In addition, a higher product substitutability has a positive impact on the system stability, pushing the “cooperation” business alliance towards a more coordinated outcome.

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Complexity and implications on channel conflict under the uncertain impacts of online customer reviews

Cited by 19 publications

References 37 publications

Pricing Strategies in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain With Sales Efforts and Channel Conflicts

Pricing Strategies in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain With Sales Efforts and Channel Conflicts

Complex Dynamic Analysis for Game Model under Different Regulatory Levels in China’s Housing Rental Market

Analysis of Dynamic Cournot Game in a Coopetition Supply Chain

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