Complexity of Manipulating and Controlling Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting

Yang, Yongjie

doi:10.24963/ijcai.2019/90

Cited by 11 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 81 publications

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“…In the setting where the number of winners is fixed, manipulative attacks for (approval-based) multi-winner voting systems have been examined in the literature [2,11,12,33,46,47,51,52]. Originally, the study of control scenarios where voters are added, deleted, or partitioned was initiated in the context of elections [4,43,54,55].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Manipulative Attacks and Group Identification

Junker¹

2022

Preprint

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The group identification problem asks to identify a socially qualified subgroup among a group of individuals based on their pairwise valuations. There are several different rules that can be used to determine the social qualification status. In this work, we consider the consent rules, the consensus-start-respecting rule, and the liberal-start-respecting rule. In the context of group identification, a manipulative attack is the attempt by an outsider to influence the outcome of the selection process through certain means of manipulation. These means include adding, removing, or partitioning individuals, as well as bribing individuals to change their opinion. In this work, we provide an overview of manipulative attacks in group identification as well as group identification with partial profiles. In particular, we study the computational complexity of the corresponding problems. Most results presented in this work are aggregated from the literature, but we also show results for previously unstudied problems; these include general and exact group control in binary profiles and in ternary profiles, as well as constructive group control in r-profiles. For many considered problems, we also study the parameterized complexity. KurzzusammenfassungBei Group Identification geht es darum, aus einer Gruppe von Individuen auf der Grundlage ihrer gegenseitigen Bewertungen eine sozial qualifizierte Untergruppe zu bestimmen. Es gibt verschiedene Regeln, die zur Bestimmung der sozial qualifizierten Individuen verwendet werden können. In dieser Arbeit betrachten wir die consent rule, die consensus-start-respecting rule und die liberal-start-respecting rule. Im Kontext von Group Identification ist ein manipulativer Angriff der Versuch eines Außenstehenden, das Ergebnis des Auswahlverfahrens durch bestimmte Manipulationsmittel zu beeinflussen. Zu diesen Mitteln gehören das Hinzufügen, Entfernen oder Aufteilen von Individuen sowie die Bestechung von Individuen, ihre Meinung zu ändern. In dieser Arbeit geben wir einen Überblick über manipulative Angriffe in Group Identification sowie über Group Identification mit partial profiles. Insbesondere untersuchen wir die Berechnungskomplexität der entsprechenden Probleme. Die meisten Ergebnisse in dieser Arbeit sind aus der Literatur, aber wir zeigen auch Ergebnisse für bisher nicht untersuchte Probleme; dazu zählen general und exact group control in binary profiles und in ternary profiles sowie constructive group control in r-profiles. Für viele der betrachteten Probleme untersuchen wir auch die parametrisierte Komplexität.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Manipulative Attacks and Group Identification

Junker¹

2022

Preprint

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“…Finally, we remark that in addition to the WINNERS DETERMINATION problem, many strategic problems such as manipulation, control, and bribery for PAV, MAV, and CCAV have also received a considerable amount of study recently [12,29,59,61].…”

Section: Other Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Parameterized Complexity of Multi-winner Determination: More Effort Towards Fixed-Parameter Tractability

Yang¹,

Wang²

2021

Preprint

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We study winner determination for three prevalent k-committee selection rules, namely minimax approval voting (MAV), proportional approval voting (PAV), and Chamberlin-Courant's approval voting (CCAV). It is known that winner determination for these rules is NP-hard. Parameterized complexity of the problem has been studied with respect to some natural parameters recently. However, there are still numerous parameters that have not been considered. We revisit the parameterized complexity of winner determination by considering several important single parameters, combined parameters, and structural parameters, aiming at detecting more interesting parameters leading to fixed-parameter tractability results.

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“…As a consequence, for single-district settings with few parties only, one could use FPT bribery algorithms of Faliszewski et al [2017]. Yet, our algorithms are faster and more direct (for other means of manipulating approval-based multiwinner rules, see, e.g., [Yang, 2019;Lackner and Skowron, 2018a;Peters, 2018]).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Campaign Management in Apportionment Elections

Bredereck

Faliszewski

Furdyna

et al. 2020

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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In parliamentary elections, parties compete for a limited, typically fixed number of seats. We study the complexity of the following bribery-style problem: Given the distribution of votes among the parties, what is the smallest number of voters that need to be convinced to vote for our party, so that it gets a desired number of seats. We also run extensive experiments on real-world election data and measure the effectiveness of our method.

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Complexity of Manipulating and Controlling Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting

Cited by 11 publications

References 81 publications

Manipulative Attacks and Group Identification

Manipulative Attacks and Group Identification

Parameterized Complexity of Multi-winner Determination: More Effort Towards Fixed-Parameter Tractability

Strategic Campaign Management in Apportionment Elections

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