Compromise-Resilient Anti-jamming for Wireless Sensor Networks

Abstract

Abstract. Jamming is a kind of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack in which an adversary purposefully emits radio frequency signals to corrupt wireless transmissions. Thus, the communications among normal sensor nodes become difficult or even impossible. Although some research has been conducted on countering jamming attacks, few works considered jamming by insiders. Here, an attacker first compromises some legitimate sensor nodes to acquire the common cryptographic information of the sensor network and then jams the network through those compromised sensors. In this paper, as our initial effort, we propose a compromise-resilient anti-jamming scheme called split-pairing scheme to deal with single insider jamming problem in a one-hop network setting. In our solution, the physical communication channel of a sensor network is determined by the group key shared by all the sensor nodes. When insider jamming happens, the network will generate a new group key to be shared only by all non-compromised nodes. After that, the insider jammer is revoked and will be unable to predict the future communication channels used by non-compromised nodes. We implement and evaluate our solution using the Mica2 Mote platform and show it has low recovery latency and communication overhead, and it is a practical solution for resource constrained sensor networks under the single insider jamming attack.

M-cluster and X-ray: Two methods for multi-jammer localization in wireless sensor networks

“…Dong and Liu [9] intro-duced a jamming-resistant broadcast system that organizes receivers into multiple channel-sharing broadcast groups and isolates malicious receivers using adaptive re-grouping. Jiang et al [12] proposed a compromiseresilient anti-jamming scheme called split-pairing to deal with insider jamming in a one-hop network setting. Liu and Ning [17] proposed an encoding method called BitTrickle to defend against broadband and high-power reactive jamming.…”

Robust multiple frequency multiple power localization schemes in the presence of multiple jamming attacks

“…Regarding to the scheme in [ 36 ] which studied insider jamming attacks and found that jamming attacks can be carried out by an attacker once a compromised node is exploited to reveal common cryptographic information. To address the insider jamming attacks challenge, a compromise-resilient anti-jamming scheme was proposed.…”

Self-healing wireless networks under insider jamming attacks

“…To clarify, T l is also a channel switch latency for benign nodes. Measurements show that the typical latency is 34ms for Mica2 wireless sensor motes [12] and 7.6ms for Atheros WiFi chipset [13]. For example, for a Mica2 mote with transmission rate of 19.2Kbps, it can transmit 81 bytes during the time when a jammer switches to another channel.…”