“…Yet, the general notion underlying Bayesian models has been invoked to support several profoundly different conceptualizations of how hallucinations may arise. First, an increased weighting of prior expectation in perception, such that expectations generate inaccurate percepts ( Friston, 2005 b ; Corlett et al , 2009 ; Fletcher and Frith, 2009 ; Frith and Friston, 2013 ; Teufel et al , 2015 ), second, a reduction in the relative weighting of prior expectation such that it is the relatively stronger bottom-up signal that generates the aberrant percept ( Adams et al , 2013 ), and finally, a circularity in inferential processing such that a lack of inhibitory control generates a reverberating effect: an expectation enhances a signal which then acts as additional evidence in favour of that expectation ( Jardri and Denève, 2013 , 2014 ). While some of these models might not be mutually exclusive, clearly, a computational framework that is able to encompass such differing possibilities needs close scrutiny.…”