2003
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-44898-5_17
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Computer-Assisted Verification of a Protocol for Certified Email

Abstract: Abstract. We present the formalization and verification of a recent cryptographic protocol for certified email. Relying on a tool for automatic protocol analysis, we establish the key security properties of the protocol. This case study explores the use of general correspondence assertions in automatic proofs, and aims to demonstrate the considerable power of the tool and its applicability to non-trivial, interesting protocols.

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Cited by 36 publications
(26 citation statements)
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“…We do not build a formal model for MaraDNS because it does not cache the authority and additional sections of responses containing an answer RRset and does not use trust levels for overwriting existing records. We do show attacks against all three implementations, including MaraDNS, in Table 4 We use the ProVerif protocol analysis tool, due to its success in practical formal verification of security protocols (e.g., [2]). The details of ProVerif are beyond the scope of this paper and can be found in [6].…”
Section: Modeling Methodologymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We do not build a formal model for MaraDNS because it does not cache the authority and additional sections of responses containing an answer RRset and does not use trust levels for overwriting existing records. We do show attacks against all three implementations, including MaraDNS, in Table 4 We use the ProVerif protocol analysis tool, due to its success in practical formal verification of security protocols (e.g., [2]). The details of ProVerif are beyond the scope of this paper and can be found in [6].…”
Section: Modeling Methodologymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Abadi et al [7] have designed a protocol for certified e-mail delivery that appears to have many practical advantages. Although it requires a trusted third party (TTP), this TTP is stateless and lightweight; it never has access to the clear-text of the transmitted messages.…”
Section: Literature Surveymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This approach has been followed in modeling many protocols (e.g., [3,4,9,13,18,19,37,39]). Techniques from the programming-language literature, such as typing, have been employed for proofs, sometimes with substantial extensions or variations; specialpurpose techniques have also been developed and exploited, as in the tool ProVerif on which we rely below (e.g., [2,10,23,24,28,33,36]).…”
Section: The Wmf Protocol In the Pi Calculusmentioning
confidence: 99%