Concealing of the Sink Location in WSNs by artificially homogenizing traffic intensity

Bi, Ying; Gallardo, J.R.; Makrakis, Dimitrios; Mouftah, Hussein T.

doi:10.1109/infcomw.2011.5928957

Cited by 17 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…The reason for having superior performances will be understood after the protocol becomes described. Ying et al [34] designed a concealing sink location (CSL) protocol that made a node generate the same traffic volume with the sink's neighbors by transmitting a number of fake messages. This feature enables CSL to prevent the traffic analysis attack launched by a global adversary.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such conditions are restrictive and do not apply to many cases of WSN deployments. Compared to [34], our protocol can remove some of CSL's drawbacks. In this case, a node generates fake messages according to the total number of nodes whose routing path to the sink passes the node (we have named them as 'kids' of the node).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We evaluated the performance of our approach, the conventional scheme, and the CSL scheme [34] through simulation using OPNET [48]. Note that by the term 'conventional scheme' we mean a WSN that is not transmitting FDMs; thus, it is highly vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks.…”

Section: Performance Simulation Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

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Anti-traffic analysis attack for location privacy in WSNs

Ying

Makrakis

Mouftah

2014

J Wireless Com Network

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Traditional encryption and authentication methods are not effective in preserving a sink's location privacy from a global adversary that is monitoring the network traffic. In this paper, we first propose a novel anti-traffic analysis (ATA) method to preserve the sink's location privacy. In order to confuse a local or global adversary, each node generates dummy messages, the number of which is dependent on the number of the node's children. Hence, ATA is able to prevent the adversary from acquiring valuable information on the sink's location through the traffic analysis attack. However, a larger number of dummy messages lead to consumption of extra energy. Then, we design our improved ATA (IATA) in such a way that we select some sensors to act as fake sinks, to ensure that sensors around fake sinks generate dummy messages and discard received dummy messages. Since the problem of the optimal fake sinks' placement is nondeterministic polynomial time (NP)-hard, we employ local search heuristics based on network traffic and security entropy. Performance analysis of the ATA scheme can protect the sink's location privacy, and IATA scheme can reduce energy consumption.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Anti-traffic analysis attack for location privacy in WSNs

Ying

Makrakis

Mouftah

2014

J Wireless Com Network

Self Cite

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“…Two types of sink location attacks can be used to determine the location of the sink, the global traffic analysis attack (GTA) [5][6][7][8][9] and the local traffic analysis attack (LTA) [10][11][12][13][14]. Existing sink location protection protocols mostly consider the local traffic analysis attack.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are several solutions proposed to defend against global attackers [5][6][7][8][9]. However, some of them generated high traffic volumes around the sink [5,6,9].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sink Location Protection Protocols Based on Packet Sending Rate Adjustment

Chen

Lin

Liu

et al. 2016

International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

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Sink location protection is critical to the viability of sensor networks as the central point of failure. Most existing work related to sink location protection focuses on local traffic analysis attack. In this paper, we study the sink location protection problem under a more powerful type of attack, the global traffic analysis attack. In order to hide the sink location, a protocol based on packet sending rate adjustment (SRA) is proposed. By controlling the packet sending rate of each node according to the current number of source nodes, SRA conceals the real traffic volume generated by source nodes and hence disguises the location of the sink. For further reducing the communication cost, we propose a light weight SRA protocol (L-SRA), which protects the sink location while significantly decreasing the communication cost. Performance of both SRA and L-SRA has been validated by theoretical analysis and simulation results.

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BSLPSDN: Base station location privacy via software‐defined networking (SDN) in wireless sensor networks

Abbas Bangash,

Iqbal,

Rubab

et al. 2023

Int J Communication

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SummaryBase station's location privacy in a wireless sensor network (WSN) is critical for information security and operational availability of the network. A key part of securing the base station from potential compromise is to secure the information about its physical location. This paper proposes a technique called base station location privacy via software‐defined networking (SDN) in wireless sensor networks (BSLPSDN). The inspiration comes from the architecture of SDN, where the control plane is separated from the data plane, and where control plane decides the policy for the data plane. BSLPSDN uses three categories of nodes, namely, a main controller to instruct the overall operations, a dedicated node to buffer and forward data, and lastly, a common node to sense and forward the packet. We employ three kinds of nodes to collaborate and achieve stealth for the base station and thus protecting it against the traffic‐analysis attacks. Different traits of the WSN including energy status and traffic density can actively be monitored by BSLPSDN, which positively affects the energy goals, expected life of the network, load on common nodes, and the possibility of creating diversion in the wake of an attack on the base station. We incorporated multiple experiments to analyze and evaluate the performance of our proposed algorithm. We use single controller with multiple sensor nodes and multiple controllers with multiple sensor nodes to show the level of anonymity of BS. Experiments show that providing BS anonymity via multiple controllers is the best method both in terms of energy and privacy.

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Concealing of the Sink Location in WSNs by artificially homogenizing traffic intensity

Cited by 17 publications

References 18 publications

Anti-traffic analysis attack for location privacy in WSNs

Anti-traffic analysis attack for location privacy in WSNs

Sink Location Protection Protocols Based on Packet Sending Rate Adjustment

BSLPSDN: Base station location privacy via software‐defined networking (SDN) in wireless sensor networks

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