2016
DOI: 10.1155/2016/6354514
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Sink Location Protection Protocols Based on Packet Sending Rate Adjustment

Abstract: Sink location protection is critical to the viability of sensor networks as the central point of failure. Most existing work related to sink location protection focuses on local traffic analysis attack. In this paper, we study the sink location protection problem under a more powerful type of attack, the global traffic analysis attack. In order to hide the sink location, a protocol based on packet sending rate adjustment (SRA) is proposed. By controlling the packet sending rate of each node according to the cu… Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…To mitigate such a threat, many countermeasures are proposed to prevent, or at least delay, an adversary from locating the BS. Many of these countermeasures aim to change the traffic pattern in the network to confuse the adversary [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21]. Others, e.g., [13], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], and [33] introduce extra fake packets to hide the data routes and hence lead the adversary to wrong locations.…”
Section: A Traffic Analysis Threatmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…To mitigate such a threat, many countermeasures are proposed to prevent, or at least delay, an adversary from locating the BS. Many of these countermeasures aim to change the traffic pattern in the network to confuse the adversary [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21]. Others, e.g., [13], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], and [33] introduce extra fake packets to hide the data routes and hence lead the adversary to wrong locations.…”
Section: A Traffic Analysis Threatmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similarly, Chakraborty et al [20] use forwarding delay as a means of blending traffic from different sources into one stream and confuse the adversary. Meanwhile, L-SRA [21] strives for having the same transmission rate among all nodes via buffering. It utilizes the number of active nodes at a given time to set the rate along the route to the BS.…”
Section: ) Exploiting Bs Mobilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similarly, forwarding delay is used in [59] so that the traffic from a certain source is blended with traffic from other sources; however, unlike [27], the delay is determined using an open queue model. Meanwhile, L-SRA [60] uses packet buffering to equalize the same transmission rate among all nodes. It takes into account the number of active sources at a given time to set the transmission rates along the routes towards the BS.…”
Section: Iii) Routing Topology Obfuscationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The sensor nodes around a fake sink FS i generate dummy messages that get discarded when received by FS i . On the other hand, L‐SRA opts to hide the BS by unifying the transmission rate at all relays and data sources through packet buffering. Hong et al use a traffic shaping scheme that randomly delays the transmission of packets to hide the traffic pattern.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%