Concepts and implications of altruism bias and pathological altruism

Oakley, Barbara

doi:10.1073/pnas.1302547110

Cited by 51 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 75 publications

(54 reference statements)

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“…Of the two charities presented to participants, one was objectively better at achieving its outcomes but less well-known, whereas the other was objectively worse but more popular. If sufficiently high, empathy might lead to "pathological" or maladaptive altruism: pro-social behavior that is ineffective or even counter-productive (Oakley, 2013). One study found that a physiological response linked to pro-sociality (i.e., vagal nerve activity), if sufficiently high, can interfere with pro-social behavior (Kogan et al, 2014).…”

Section: Experiments 4: Unintentional Empathy Associates With Donationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The empathy impulse: A multinomial model of intentional and unintentional empathy for pain.

Cameron¹,

Spring²,

Todd³

2017

Emotion

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Empathy for pain is often described as automatic. Here, we used implicit measurement and multinomial modeling to formally quantify unintentional empathy for pain: empathy that occurs despite intentions to the contrary. We developed the Pain Identification Task (PIT), a sequential priming task wherein participants judge painfulness of target experiences while trying to avoid influence of prime experiences. Using multinomial modeling, we distinguished three component processes underlying PIT performance: empathy toward target stimuli (Intentional Empathy), empathy toward prime stimuli (Unintentional Empathy), and bias to judge target stimuli as painful (Response Bias). In Experiment 1, imposing a fast (vs. slow) response deadline uniquely reduced Intentional Empathy. In Experiment 2, inducing imagine-self (vs. imagine-other) perspective-taking uniquely increased Unintentional Empathy. In Experiment 3, Intentional and Unintentional Empathy were stronger toward targets with typical (vs. atypical) pain outcomes, suggesting that outcome information matters and that effects on the PIT are not reducible to affective priming. Typicality of pain outcomes more weakly affected performance on an Object Identification Task-wherein target stimuli were merely categorized rather than judged for painfulness-than on the PIT, suggesting that effects on the latter are not reducible to semantic priming. In Experiment 4, Unintentional Empathy was stronger for participants who engaged in costly donation to cancer charities; but this parameter was also high for those who donated to an objectively worse but socially more popular charity, suggesting that overly high empathy may facilitate maladaptive altruism. Theoretical and practical applications of our modeling approach for understanding variation in empathy are discussed.

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Section: Experiments 4: Unintentional Empathy Associates With Donationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The empathy impulse: A multinomial model of intentional and unintentional empathy for pain.

Cameron¹,

Spring²,

Todd³

2017

Emotion

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Section: Experiments 4: Unintentional Empathy Associates With Donationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The empathy impulse: A multinomial model of intentional and unintentional empathy for pain

Cameron¹,

Spring²,

Todd³

2017

Preprint

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Empathy for pain is often described as automatic. Here, we used implicit measurement and multinomial modeling to formally quantify unintentional empathy for pain: empathy that occurs despite intentions to the contrary. We developed the pain identification task (PIT), a sequential priming task wherein participants judge the painfulness of target experiences while trying to avoid the influence of prime experiences. Using multinomial modeling, we distinguished 3 component processes underlying PIT performance: empathy toward target stimuli (Intentional Empathy), empathy toward prime stimuli (Unintentional Empathy), and bias to judge target stimuli as painful (Response Bias). In Experiment 1, imposing a fast (vs. slow) response deadline uniquely reduced Intentional Empathy. In Experiment 2, inducing imagine-self (vs. imagine-other) perspective-taking uniquely increased Unintentional Empathy. In Experiment 3, Intentional and Unintentional Empathy were stronger toward targets with typical (vs. atypical) pain outcomes, suggesting that outcome information matters and that effects on the PIT are not reducible to affective priming. Typicality of pain outcomes more weakly affected task performance when target stimuli were merely categorized rather than judged for painfulness, suggesting that effects on the latter are not reducible to semantic priming. In Experiment 4, Unintentional Empathy was stronger for participants who engaged in costly donation to cancer charities, but this parameter was also high for those who donated to an objectively worse but socially more popular charity, suggesting that overly high empathy may facilitate maladaptive altruism. Theoretical and practical applications of our modeling approach for understanding variation in empathy are discussed.

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“…A perceiver might misunderstand the goal a target is trying to pursue, or the means of goal pursuit, or the target's own understanding of goal progress. Mistaking any of these aspects of another person's goal pursuit could produce maladaptive empathy, in the sense of being suboptimal or harmful to the target (Oakley, 2013).…”

Section: The Target's Goalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The ends of empathy: Constructing empathy from value-based choice

Cameron¹,

Cunningham²,

Saunders³

et al. 2017

Preprint

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Empathy, or the ability to understand and resonate with the experiences of others, has long been considered by philosophers and scientists to be an important part of human morality. We present a new framework that explains empathy as resulting from motivated decisions. Drawing on models of cybernetic control, value-based choice, and constructionism, we suggest that empathy shifts depending on how people value and prioritize conflicting goals. We generate novel predictions about the nature of empathy from the science of goal pursuit, and address its apparent limitations. Empathy appears less sensitive to suffering of large numbers and out-groups, leading some to suggest that empathy is an unreliable ethical guide. Whereas these arguments assume that empathy is a limited-capacity resource, we suggest that apparent limits of empathy reflect byproducts of domain-general goal pursuit. Arguments against empathy reflect a misguided essentialism: they mistake our own choices to avoid empathy for intrinsic features of empathy, treating empathy as a capricious emotion in conflict with reason. We suggest that empathy results from a rational decision, even if its rationality is bounded, as in many decisions in everyday life. Empathy may only be limited if we choose to avoid pursuing empathic goals.Ends of empathy 3 "Empathy isn't just something that happens to us-a meteor shower of synapses firing across the brain-it's also a choice we make: to pay attention, to extend ourselves. It's made of exertion, the dowdier cousin of impulse." -Leslie Jamison (2014), The Empathy ExamsIn the summer of 2016, empathy went viral. The world learned about Harambe, a silverback gorilla in the Cincinnati Zoo who was shot and killed by zookeepers in an attempt to save the life of a child who had fallen into his enclosure. In the aftermath of the incident, people around the world expressed support for Harambe in a variety of ways, ranging from social media posts to charitable donations to Harambe tattoos. Empathy for Harambe became a meme in its own right. On the other hand, many people appeared to lack empathy for the zookeepers, the child, and the child's mother, to the point that some even issued death threats. This example reveals a broader point about empathy (and the lack thereof): it can feel effortless, contagious, a passion to which we are subject, rather than something we choose or control.Empathy-our ability to understand and resonate with the experiences of others-is typically considered an emotion, which can entail the conceptual baggage that many people associate with emotion. People often see emotions as passions that are out of our control, as something that happen to us. This idea has much precedent. The term derives from the Greek empatheia, which takes feeling or passion (pathos) and directs it at or into (em) someone else;this was adapted to the German Einfühlung ("feeling into"), and translated into English as empathy (Wispe, 1987). These traditions emphasize continuity of empathy with emotions, and in so doing, ca...

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Concepts and implications of altruism bias and pathological altruism

Cited by 51 publications

References 75 publications

The empathy impulse: A multinomial model of intentional and unintentional empathy for pain.

The empathy impulse: A multinomial model of intentional and unintentional empathy for pain.

The empathy impulse: A multinomial model of intentional and unintentional empathy for pain

The ends of empathy: Constructing empathy from value-based choice

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