2009
DOI: 10.3758/pbr.16.5.914
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Concepts are not represented by conscious imagery

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Cited by 34 publications
(37 citation statements)
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“…This indicates that mental representations constructed during language comprehension are highly specified in terms of perceptually based information, i.e., the mental representation of an event incorporates information that is not explicitly encoded in the input, but which is available from experience. Numerous studies report similar findings for other perceptual dimensions such as shape, orientation and color information (see Zwaan and Pecher, 2012 for a discussion and recent replication experiments), and provide additional evidence that representations are constructed incrementally (Sato et al, 2013), unconsciously (Pecher et al, 2009a; Vukovic and Williams, 2014) and are not driven by task dependent strategies (Pecher et al, 2009b). In contrast to more traditional views of concepts as amodal and abstract entities, perception-based accounts typically envision conceptual representation as a dynamic simulation process.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 69%
“…This indicates that mental representations constructed during language comprehension are highly specified in terms of perceptually based information, i.e., the mental representation of an event incorporates information that is not explicitly encoded in the input, but which is available from experience. Numerous studies report similar findings for other perceptual dimensions such as shape, orientation and color information (see Zwaan and Pecher, 2012 for a discussion and recent replication experiments), and provide additional evidence that representations are constructed incrementally (Sato et al, 2013), unconsciously (Pecher et al, 2009a; Vukovic and Williams, 2014) and are not driven by task dependent strategies (Pecher et al, 2009b). In contrast to more traditional views of concepts as amodal and abstract entities, perception-based accounts typically envision conceptual representation as a dynamic simulation process.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 69%
“…In conceptual-processing research, this idea has previously been rejected because of the absence of correlations between the size of the modality-switch effect discussed in our introduction (Pecher et al, 2003) and visual-imagery measures (Pecher, van Dantzig, & Schifferstein, 2009). In the present study, we took an experimental approach, and our results support the involvement of imagery.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This will result in a longer reaction time and/or a lower accuracy, similar to modality-switching costs in perceptual tasks (Spence, Nicholls, & Driver, 2001). Conceptual modality-switch effects have been found in various property-verification studies (e.g., Marques, 2006; Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2003; Pecher, Van Dantzig, & Schifferstein, 2009; Vermeulen, Corneille & Niedenthal, 2008). Other studies demonstrated direct interactions between conceptual processing and perceptual processing, providing even stronger evidence for the theory that the sensory-motor system is involved in conceptual representation (Van Dantzig, Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2008; Vermeulen et al, 2008).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 94%