Conceptual Clarity, Freedom, and Normative Ideas

Abstract

Adri an Blau makes three main criticisms of my article on positive and negative freedom. 1 First, that the positive-negative freedom distinction is superfluous because it fails to address any important normative arguments. Secondly, that my interpretation of T. H. Green is wrong in certain respects. Thirdly, he claims that my 'normative analysis does not always convince'. 2 I see two reason's for Blau's first charge. To start with, Blau does not believe that conceptual clarity necessarily contributes to better normative analysis. If there is a unifying theme in Blau's criticisms, it is that normative arguments are more important than conceptual distinctions. So strong is his critique of conceptual clarity that one gets the impression that there is a reverse relation between the degree of conceptual clarity, on the one hand, and significant normative messages, on the other. The topic of freedom falls into this dangerous category of topics generating a permanent discussion about conceptual clarification. Because of this, Blau believes it is worth dismissing all talk of such distinctions, and of freedom altogether, and focusing directly on normative issues. It is implied in his criticisms, that nothing of normative significance can be explained via the terminology of freedom.Secondly, Blau thinks that Berlin's and Green's important messages stand apart from their discussion of the distinction between positive and negative freedom. This is linked to Blau's general scepticism about the conceptual analysis of freedom expressed in his statement that 'the debate over positive and negative freedom has created more heat than light'. 3 Blau's response gives me a second chance to explain why the positive-negative freedom dis-554 AUTHOR'S NOTE: I would like to acknowledge the help of Timothy O'Hagan, Peter Nicholson, and Avital Simhony, who gave me detailed comments, and to thank Richard Cookson and Stephen White for their editorial suggestions.

Isoi and Homoioi

“…79 However, as Maria Dimova-Cookson argues, it is acts of positive liberty which create negative liberty for others. 80 Positive liberty is "the liberation of the powers of all men equally for contributions to a common good." 81 Positive liberty demands that all are able to contribute to a common good; thus, there must be equality in this sense for rights recognition to occur.…”

A Liberalism of the Common Good: Some Recent Studies of T. H. Green's Moral and Political Theory

“…They could only be fully appreciated, however, as building blocks in that theory (Blau 2004;Dimova-Cookson 2004). Divorced from the normative theory, they tell us very little about Green, though they may be used as a foundation for a new theory.…”

“…The second point is that Dimova-Cookson's analysis focuses on the two conceptual couples—negative and positive freedom which are underpinned by juristic and moral freedom, respectively—almost as if they were independent of Green's own normative theory of freedom. They could only be fully appreciated, however, as building blocks in that theory (Blau 2004; Dimova-Cookson 2004). Divorced from the normative theory, they tell us very little about Green, though they may be used as a foundation for a new theory.…”