This article addresses the question of whether we can explain moral action in terms of an attraction to a moral ideal. It defends T. H. Green's internalist ethics against John Skorupski's externalist claim that moral ideals are optional whereas moral duties are not. A parallel is drawn between the Internalism and Externalism debate in ethics and the liberal-communitarian debate in political theory. My defence of Internalism offers new arguments in support of communitarian approaches to the nature of moral action. Green's internalist ethics provides the communitarian discourse with the universalist moral dimension it traditionally lacks.

Adri an Blau makes three main criticisms of my article on positive and negative freedom. 1 First, that the positive-negative freedom distinction is superfluous because it fails to address any important normative arguments. Secondly, that my interpretation of T. H. Green is wrong in certain respects. Thirdly, he claims that my 'normative analysis does not always convince'. 2 I see two reason's for Blau's first charge. To start with, Blau does not believe that conceptual clarity necessarily contributes to better normative analysis. If there is a unifying theme in Blau's criticisms, it is that normative arguments are more important than conceptual distinctions. So strong is his critique of conceptual clarity that one gets the impression that there is a reverse relation between the degree of conceptual clarity, on the one hand, and significant normative messages, on the other. The topic of freedom falls into this dangerous category of topics generating a permanent discussion about conceptual clarification. Because of this, Blau believes it is worth dismissing all talk of such distinctions, and of freedom altogether, and focusing directly on normative issues. It is implied in his criticisms, that nothing of normative significance can be explained via the terminology of freedom.Secondly, Blau thinks that Berlin's and Green's important messages stand apart from their discussion of the distinction between positive and negative freedom. This is linked to Blau's general scepticism about the conceptual analysis of freedom expressed in his statement that 'the debate over positive and negative freedom has created more heat than light'. 3 Blau's response gives me a second chance to explain why the positive-negative freedom dis-554 AUTHOR'S NOTE: I would like to acknowledge the help of Timothy O'Hagan, Peter Nicholson, and Avital Simhony, who gave me detailed comments, and to thank Richard Cookson and Stephen White for their editorial suggestions.

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