Internalism and Externalism in Ethics Applied to the Liberal-Communitarian Debate

Abstract

This article addresses the question of whether we can explain moral action in terms of an attraction to a moral ideal. It defends T. H. Green's internalist ethics against John Skorupski's externalist claim that moral ideals are optional whereas moral duties are not. A parallel is drawn between the Internalism and Externalism debate in ethics and the liberal-communitarian debate in political theory. My defence of Internalism offers new arguments in support of communitarian approaches to the nature of moral action. Green's internalist ethics provides the communitarian discourse with the universalist moral dimension it traditionally lacks.

The involvement of university faculty members in social planning: motivating and hindering factors

“…These finding show, in accordance with the hypothesis, that the social views based on a perspective of civil society (Samier 2002;Stephanos 1999) and communitarianism (Arthur 1998;Burtonwood 1998;Dimova-Cookson 2005;Etzioni 2003), which call for mobilizing social, organizational, and personal forces outside the public and government sector, contribute to faculty members' support for involvement in social planning.…”

“…They oppose passivity and expect individuals to be actively involved in and contribute to the community in which they live (Brint 2001;Burtonwood 1998;Selznic 1995). The communitarian approach opposes the weakening of community responsibility that is supported by the proponents of the liberal approach, which favours arrangements that stress individual rights, and isolate individuals as subject to rights and duties, rather than the community to which they belong (Arthur 1998;Dimova-Cookson 2005;Etzioni 2003;Franklin 2000).…”

‘Internalist’ Ethics, Communitarianism and T. H. Green: A Reply to Dimova-Cookson

“…As already noted, one purpose of Dimova‐Cookson's article was to provide further support to communitarian thought by highlighting how Green's internalist moral philosophy chimes in with it (although it is conceded that there is no necessary connection between internalist views and communitarianism (Dimova‐Cookson 2005, 27)). One form the alleged support takes is the belief that Green accounts for the actual moral genealogy of moral action, how it emerges and develops in social life in pursuit of the moral ideal.…”

“…It is not clear if in the internalist world there is one moral ideal or many. From ‘moral action’ as explained ‘in terms of an attraction to a moral ideal’ (Dimova-Cookson 2005, 18), emphasis added) and ‘we are moral agents because we have a capacity to pursue a moral ideal’ (ibid., 22), we move to the possibly pluralist statement that morality is a ‘personal endorsement of a moral ideal’, and then to the apparently pluralistic claim that ‘everyone who acts as a moral agent has adopted such an ideal’ (ibid., 23, emphasis added. There are also references to moral ideal s on pp.…”

“…According to Maria Dimova‐Cookson (2005), moral action for T. H. Green can be explained in terms of an attraction to a moral ideal: moral agency derives from our capacity to pursue a moral ideal, and thus to develop and improve ourselves. The ideal is desired not as a means to an end but unconditionally.…”