Conceptualizing and Measuring Institutional Variation in National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs)

Abstract

A wealth of literature argues that domestic institutions can sometimes restrain government repression. In this article, we highlight an institution tasked specifically with protecting and promoting human rights: the National Human Rights Institution (NHRI). Although common international standards exist, NHRIs exhibit substantial variation in their organization, the rights that they protect, the activities they permit, and the manner in which they appoint their members. Scholarship to date has conceptualized and measured NHRIs dichotomously; an NHRI either exists or it does not. We present data that highlights NHRI heterogeneity collected via content analysis of NHRI annual reports, NHRI websites, national constitutions, government legislation, and other sources. Using these data, we show NHRIs that can publish their findings and NHRIs that can punish offenders are each associated with less state torture. These data will allow future researchers to better explore important questions regarding NHRI origins, design, processes, and effectiveness.

Does Police Militarization Increase Repression?

“…National human rights institutions (NHRIs), domestic institutions tasked with promoting and protecting human rights, also provide institutional protection from repression (Cole and Ramirez 2013; Welch 2017; Welch, DeMeritt, and Conrad 2021). Further, while enacting their rights protection mandate, many NHRIs monitor and comment upon police activity within the state, which may influence the extent to which police (do not) militarize.…”

“…Further, while enacting their rights protection mandate, many NHRIs monitor and comment upon police activity within the state, which may influence the extent to which police (do not) militarize. We include a dichotomous indicator for NHRI presence in a given country-year taken from the NHRIs Data Collection Project (Welch, DeMeritt, and Conrad 2021).…”

“…But what if the security institutions of a country are designed in such a way that their authoritarian nature is not only tolerated but encouraged? 4 Instead of looking at how political and legal institutional design protects human rights (Chilton and Versteeg 2016; Cingranelli and Filippov 2010; Powell and Staton 2009; Welch, DeMeritt, and Conrad 2021), we assess the extent to which the militarized design of security institutions decreases protection. By doing so, we join those concerned with police and repression (Curtice 2021; Curtice and Behlendorf 2021; della Porta 2011; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Eck, Conrad, and Crabtree 2021; Soss and Weaver 2017; Soule and Davenport 2009) by focusing on the militarization of the police.…”

The Role and Authority of Komnas Ham in Handling, Violation and Protection of Human Rights

“…30 Dalam Undang-Undang No. 39 tahun 1999 tentang Hak Asasi Manusia 31 Posisi and Manusia, "PENELITIAN. "…”

A Room Full of ‘Views’: Introducing a New Dataset to Explore Compliance with the Decisions of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ Individual Complaints Procedures

“…Next, we assume that the more views a country has received, the more accustomed it is to the follow-up process and thus, the more likely it will send a reply that will then be discussed in the follow-up reports. Since it is likely that state behavior follows similar patterns across different human rights reporting procedures at the UN level, we follow Creamer and Simmons (2020, 19) and also include a country’s GDP per capita (current US$, World Bank), the presence of an NHRI with an A- or B-rating by GANHRI (Welch, DeMeritt, and Conrad 2021), and the number of ratified human rights treaties per country-year in the selection model. Results of the selection model are shown in Table A3 (appendix).…”