No abstract

No abstract

Vera Shikhelman’s recent article on the implementation of the views of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) took a valuable first step towards addressing the question why states do, or do not, comply with adverse treaty body views. In this contribution, we contend that parts of the chosen theoretical and methodological approach are somewhat problematic, however, and ultimately weaken the overall strength and reliability of Shikhelman’s findings. Theoretically, we question whether hypotheses developed in the context of studying compliance with international law and legally binding court judgments can be transferred to legally non-binding views without adjusting for potentially consequential differences in their legal status. Methodologically, we note certain issues concerning the data generated by the HRC’s follow-up procedure and its use in Shikhelman’s analysis, and suggest that statistical methods that take into consideration the time dimension of implementation processes, notably survival analysis, yield analytically more convincing causal inferences. We provide illustrative results of such a methodologically revised approach to examining compliance with adverse HRC views that reveal more fine-grained insights into the temporally unfolding processes of implementing such decisions.

Quantitative research into the effectiveness of the UN human rights treaty bodies (UNTBs) in eliciting remedial responses from states is impeded by a lack of usable data on how states respond to their decisions. The new Treaty Body Views Dataset (TBVD) aims to fill this gap. It comprises details on all published decisions in individual complaints cases issued by the UNTBs between 1979 and 2019 and matches these with information on their state of compliance. The TBVD can be used for research on the activities of the treaty bodies, the nature of the decisions themselves, or state behavior following a decision. An empirical application illustrates how the TBVD can advance knowledge about the factors that correlate with compliance with adverse UNTB decisions. Results show that the likelihood of implementation hinges critically on decision-level characteristics, and reveal differences and similarities between compliance with UNTB decisions and regional human rights court judgments.