Conceptualizing Cyber Deterrence by Entanglement

Brantly, Aaron F.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2624926

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Existing literature on public support for retaliation often attributes public attitudes to deterrence and escalation dynamics. Attitudes about deterrence and escalation have been theorized to differ between cyber and kinetic operations (Brantly 2018a; Borghard and Lonergan 2019; Fischerkeller and Harknett 2017; Libicki 2012; Lin 2012; Lindsay 2015). However, we find that respondents have the same views on deterrence and escalation in the cyber and physical domains.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Regardless of the means, receiving a more distant treatment is associated with depressed support for retaliation. Previous researchers have suggested delays in attribution make it harder to respond to cyber attacks (Brantly 2018a; Kello 2013). These delays can be the result of attribution challenges or intentional decisions by actors making attribution claims.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Responding to Uncertainty: The Importance of Covertness in Support for Retaliation to Cyber and Kinetic Attacks

Hedgecock

Sukin

2023

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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This paper investigates the escalation dynamics of cyber attacks. Two main theories have been advanced. First, “means-based” theory argues attack type determines response; cyber attacks are less likely to escalate than kinetic attacks. Second, “effects-based” theory argues an attack’s material consequences determine the likelihood of retaliation. We advance a third perspective, arguing that the covertness of an attack has the largest effect on its propensity towards escalation. We identify two characteristics of covertness that affect support for retaliation: the certainty of attribution and its timing. We use a survey experiment to assess public support for retaliation, while varying the means, effects, timing, and attribution certainty of attacks. We find no evidence for the effects-based approach, instead finding high levels of support for retaliation regardless of an attack’s scale. We find that the most significant contributor to support for retaliation is an attack’s covertness.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Responding to Uncertainty: The Importance of Covertness in Support for Retaliation to Cyber and Kinetic Attacks

Hedgecock

Sukin

2023

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…Better technical, legal, and social processes of attribution can clarify who was likely behind an attack. Entanglement and deterrence by denial can discourage attacks by manipulating the cost-benefit calculus of potential aggressors [13, 14,16]. Cross-domain deterrence postures can link cyber to the wider panoply of tools at the disposal of government [23,24].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The frequent failure of deterrence in cyberspace is well-documented, at least at the level of theory. In major ways, deterrence fails because of what is known as the "attribution problem" [11][12][13][14][15][16][17]. Stockpiled arsenals of guns, bombs, and cyber bullets can sometimes effectively deter opponents.…”

Section: Janus-faced Attribution Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pick Your Poison: The Attribution Paradox in Cyberwar

Jardine¹,

Porter²

2020

Preprint

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Certainty matters in cyberspace. The so-called attribution problem can impede deterrence, making cyberattacks more likely. But attribution problems can also limit conflict escalation, keeping nations safer. Using a discrete choice experimental design, this article quantifies the scope of the attribution problem for both deterrence and escalation. The results suggest that the attribution problem is really only a problem for deterrence and actually helps limit conflict escalation by reducing support for more severe retaliatory options.

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“…Den stadige tettere tilknytningen mellom aktører (stater, organisasjoner og mennesker) skaper flere potensielle sårbarheter, men det kan også gjøre det vanskelig å gjennomføre offensive cyberoperasjoner uten at det forårsaker utilsiktet skade. Ved å styrke globaliseringens fremvekst kan man redusere risikovilligheten hos mulige fiendtlige aktører: «By more thoroughly entangling both friend and foe the aggregate benefits for maintaining and enhancing good behavior within the cyberspace increase and reinforce risk averse behaviors» (Brantly, 2018). For småstater er dette praktisk sett kanskje en mer farbar vei fordi det ikke innebaerer paritet i offensive og defensive cyberkapasiteter for å ha effekt.…”

Section: Strategi For Avskrekking I Cyberdomenetunclassified

Avskrekking som element i cybersikkerhetsstrategi fra et småstatsperspektiv

Kristiansen

Hoem

2019

Internasjonal Politikk

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Sammendrag Artikkelen ser på mulighetene og utfordringene med avskrekking som strategisk tilnaerming til det stadig viktigere cyberdomenet, fra et småstatsperspektiv. Forfatterne argumenterer for at det er essensielt å opprette og ansvarliggjøre en multinasjonal og multidepartemental/-sektoriell cyberorganisasjon for at reell cyberavskrekking skal vaere mulig å generere. Innledningsvis beskriver artikkelen den klassiske og utvidete oppfatningen av avskrekking, og hvilke kriterier som må ligge til grunn for å kunne oppnå avskrekkende effekt: kapasitet, kredibilitet og evnen til å kommunisere effektivt. Sett fra et globalt sikkerhetsperspektiv har muligheten til å generere avskrekkende effekt vaert med på å forme verden, spesielt i perioden 1945 til 1990. Kompleksiteten i sikkerhetssektoren har imidlertid økt signifikant siden da, mye grunnet økt global konnektivitet og fremveksten av cyberdomenet. Artikkelen diskuterer hvordan kriteriene for avskrekking utfordres når strategien skal appliseres i cyberdomenet, med fokus på problemene knyttet til antallet aktører/vektorer, ulike motiver for handlinger, manglende felles grunnlag som utgangspunkt for å adressere utfordringene, og forskjellig oppfatning omkring attribusjon og proporsjonalitetsprinsippet. Forfatterne fremholder at disse utfordringene gjør det vanskeligere, men desto viktigere å identifisere hvordan man kan generere avskrekking i cyberdomenet-spesielt for høyteknologiske småstater, som Norge. Å håndtere dette på en god måte forutsetter at man ser på bredden av avskrekkingsteori i sammenheng over tid, og småstater må erkjenne sine svakheter og spille på sine styrker. Anbefalingene som

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Conceptualizing Cyber Deterrence by Entanglement

Cited by 4 publications

References 6 publications

Responding to Uncertainty: The Importance of Covertness in Support for Retaliation to Cyber and Kinetic Attacks

Responding to Uncertainty: The Importance of Covertness in Support for Retaliation to Cyber and Kinetic Attacks

Pick Your Poison: The Attribution Paradox in Cyberwar

Avskrekking som element i cybersikkerhetsstrategi fra et småstatsperspektiv

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