Conclusion

Conditions of civilian control in new democracies: an empirical analysis of 28 ‘third wave’ democracies

“…Consequently, we code non-violent crises (CONIAS intensity of 2) as more in the set of ‘no meaningful threats’ (fuzzy score 0.3), and low intensity conflict (CONIAS value of 3) as more in the set of ‘meaningful threats’ (fuzzy score 0.7). As we expect civilians to be risk averse, we draw on the maximum intensity a conflict reaches in a given phase to code the complete phase. The literature on civil–military relations suggests different forms of support civilians can receive from external actors, ranging from aid, international military co-operation, to membership in supranational organizations (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2008). In order to capture this broad range of international influence, we operationalize the condition ‘intif’ as an index of three individual conditions: (1) membership or credible expectation of membership, based on the beginning of membership application procedures, in NATO or the EU as organizations that demand strict civilian control of the military from member states (Barany, 1997).…”

“…The literature on civil–military relations suggests different forms of support civilians can receive from external actors, ranging from aid, international military co-operation, to membership in supranational organizations (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2008). In order to capture this broad range of international influence, we operationalize the condition ‘intif’ as an index of three individual conditions: (1) membership or credible expectation of membership, based on the beginning of membership application procedures, in NATO or the EU as organizations that demand strict civilian control of the military from member states (Barany, 1997).…”

“…A critical survey of the literature leaves five factors that could plausibly affect the successful application of civilian control strategies (Croissant et al , 2011, 2013): (1) the absence of domestic security threats; (2) strong international support for democratic reforms; (3) a strong civil society; (4) the pre-existence of some effective institutions of civilian control before the transition to democracy; (5) and the degree of consolidation of the overall democratic institutions: Internal security threats and domestic armed conflict make civilians dependent on the military’s coercive capacities and thus reduce the willingness and ability of civilians to employ robust control strategies (Alagappa, 2001). Consequently, we expect that the absence of domestic security threats is a condition for the strengthening of civilian control and that internal security threats lead to weak civilian control. If external actors support the establishment of civilian control, this increases civilians’ ability to employ more robust control strategies and enact them successfully (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2008). Therefore, we expect that international support contributes to the strengthening of civilian control. A strong civil society allows civilians to pursue more robust strategies, as it ‘constitute[s] a powerful safeguard against military intervention’ (Belkin and Schofer, 2003: 605; Caparini et al , 2006).…”

“…If external actors support the establishment of civilian control, this increases civilians’ ability to employ more robust control strategies and enact them successfully (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2008). Therefore, we expect that international support contributes to the strengthening of civilian control.…”

“… 8 Other regional organizations in the Americas, Asia, and Africa are less strict in minimal requirements for democracy or civilian control (Bruneau and Trinkunas, 2008). …”