Conclusion: Presidentialism and the Party System

Mainwaring, Scott; Shugart, Matthew Søberg

doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174800.012

Cited by 157 publications

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“…Segundo um trabalho acerca de 54 democracias (Amorim Neto e Cox, 1997:169-170), o Brasil possuía na década de 80 um dos Legislativos mais fragmentados do mundo. Na opinião de muitos analistas, um nível tão elevado de fragmentação mutila a capacidade decisória do sistema político (Lamounier, 1994;Mainwaring, 1997), prejudicando seriamente as perspectivas da consolidação democrática. Para medir a fragmentação do Legislativo, uso o índice convencional de número efetivo de partidos, de Laakso e Taagepera (1979).…”

Section: Multipartidarismounclassified

“…Muitos autores já analisaram essa questão (Mainwaring, 1993;Mainwaring e Shugart, 1997;Jones, 1995) e suas conclusões geralmente coincidem: quanto maior a fragmentação legislativa, menor é o tamanho do partido do presidente. Os dados acima apresentados mostram que o Brasil é um eloqüente exemplo disso.…”

Section: Tabela 3 Número Efetivo De Partidos Com Representaçãounclassified

“…Aqui focalizo apenas os problemas de fragmentação parlamentar e dos poderes presidenciais, deixando de fora a questão do federalismo. Os leitores interessados nesse último tema devem consultar os trabalhos de Abrúcio (1998), Dias (1997), Mainwaring (1997) e Samuels e Abrúcio (1997). 6.…”

Section: Conclusãounclassified

“…6. Outros resumos da Constituição de 1988 podem ser encontrados em Carey, Amorim Neto e Shugart (1997) e Mainwaring (1997). 7.…”

Section: Conclusãounclassified

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Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles, and Coalition Discipline in Brazil

Neto¹

2002

Legislative Politics in Latin America

155

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Section: Multipartidarismounclassified

Section: Tabela 3 Número Efetivo De Partidos Com Representaçãounclassified

Section: Conclusãounclassified

“…6. Outros resumos da Constituição de 1988 podem ser encontrados em Carey, Amorim Neto e Shugart (1997) e Mainwaring (1997). 7.…”

Section: Conclusãounclassified

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Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles, and Coalition Discipline in Brazil

Neto¹

2002

Legislative Politics in Latin America

155

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“…Attempts to test the impact of presidentialism or the large numbers of parties associated with polarized pluralism on democratic survival only infrequently and inconsistently attain levels of conventional significance. The collective weight of these studies leads to the conclusion that these particular institutions are irrelevant to survival in general but may matter contingently in very specific contexts ( Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997;Sing, 2010;Aleman & Yang, 2011;Bernhard, Nordstom &Reenock 2001;Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000;Cheibub, 2007;Madea 2010;Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2014;Svolik, 2008;Lai & MelkonianHoover, 2005;Sing 2010). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional Subsystems and the Survival of Democracy: Do Political and Civil Society Matter?

et al. 2015

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Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to the conceptualization and measurement of democracy. It is co-hosted by the University of Gothenburg and University of Notre Dame. With a V-Dem Institute at University of Gothenburg that comprises almost ten staff members, and a project team across the world with four Principal Investigators, fifteen Project Managers, 30+ Regional Managers, 170 Country Coordinators, Research Assistants, and 2,500 Country Experts, the V-Dem project is one of the largest-ever social science research-oriented data collection programs.Please address comments and/or queries for information to: Staffan I. Lindberg University of Gothenburg """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" * " *Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 16-19, Chicago IL. Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 16-19, Chicago IL. This research project was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Grant M13-0559:1, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden" 2" " AbstractHow do two central institutional subsystems of democracy -party systems and civil society -affect the persistence of democratic regimes? Despite the ability of each of these institutions to provide sources of countervailing power that make politicians accountable and thus responsive, distributionist accounts of democratic breakdown provide few insights on how such institutions may encourage parties to reach accommodation. We argue that these institutions provide credible threats against anti-system activities that would otherwise threaten the democratic compromise. We test our argument with newly available data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project by analyzing all episodes of democratic breakdown from 1900-2001. Using a split population event history estimator, we find evidence that these institutions not only forestall the timing of breakdowns among transitional democracies but also that a strong party system is critical to setting democratic regimes on the path of consolidation.3" "

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Promises and Pitfalls of Veto Player Analysis

Ganghof

2003

Swiss Political Sci Review

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Veto player approaches have come to occupy a central role in comparative politics. This article critically reviews the literature, focussing especially on veto player explanations of policy outputs and outcomes. The review highlights three problems empirical veto player studies have to face: 1) identifying the relevant veto players, 2) establishing equivalence between veto players, and 3) specifying (theoretically or empirically) veto players' policy preferences. The article concludes that empirical veto player analyses advance our understanding of political institutions and their effects, but that they should deal more systematically with the three above mentioned problems. Keywords: veto players, veto points, comparative public policy, intentional explanation Introduction 1Veto point and veto player approaches have come to occupy a central place in comparative politics, especially in the fields of comparative public policy and political economy. Virtually every policy area has been studied within at least one of the various approaches, and the relevant literature grows at a fast pace. The most elaborate and prominent approach, George Tsebelis' veto player theory (Tsebelis 1995a;, moves well beyond the explanation of particular policy outputs or economic outcomes and tries to provide a unified theoretical 1 This article grew out of a paper presented at the conference "The consequences of political institutions in Democracy", Duke University, Department of Political Science, April 5-7, 2002. In addition to the conference participants, I wish to thank Thomas Bräuninger, André Kaiser, Bernhard Kittel, Matthias L. Maier and Uwe Wagschal for helpful comments and discussions. Special thanks to Herbert Kitschelt and Fritz W. Scharpf for discussions and encouragement. All remaining errors are mine.2 STEFFEN GANGHOF perspective on political institutions in a wide variety of political systems. Tsebelis' theory systematically relates veto players to the potential for policy change in a political system, which is in turn linked to important system characteristics such as regime stability, government stability or bureaucratic independence. Tsebelis' theory can thus be seen as the main (theoretically based) competitor to Lijphart's (empirically based) distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracy (Lijphart 1999).This article has three related goals. First, I want to review the recent literature on veto points and veto players, focusing especially on explanations of policy outputs and economic outcomes. In doing this, I will for the sake of simplicity use "veto player approaches" as a general label for studies that highlight the importance of institutional veto power and refer to Tsebelis' work as veto player theory. Given the volume of the relevant literature, my aim is not to enumerate each and every veto player (hereafter: VP) study but to give the reader an idea of how this literature has developed. This point leads me to my second goal. While different VP approaches are often perceived as being close ...

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Conclusion: Presidentialism and the Party System

Cited by 157 publications

References 0 publications

Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles, and Coalition Discipline in Brazil

Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles, and Coalition Discipline in Brazil

Institutional Subsystems and the Survival of Democracy: Do Political and Civil Society Matter?

Promises and Pitfalls of Veto Player Analysis

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