Conditional reasoning following contradictory evidence: A developmental analysis

O'Brien, David P.; Overton, Willis F.

doi:10.1016/0022-0965(80)90074-0

Cited by 67 publications

(45 citation statements)

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“…Developmental change is characterized mainly by a decrease in the rate of accepting the AC and DA inferences (e.g., JanveauBrennan & Markovits, 1999;Markovits & Vachon, 1990;O'Brien & Overton, 1980). There are some less clear-cut patterns that suggest possible developmental trends toward refusing the MP and MT inferences, at least in some cases (e.g., Janveau-Brennan & Markovits, 1999;O'Brien & Overton, 1980;Rumain, Connell, & Braine, 1983), but these are inconsistent and more difficult to interpret. The refer to these types of inferences as categorical, since they result in a binary response.…”

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confidence: 99%

Different developmental patterns of simple deductive and probabilistic inferential reasoning

Markovits

Thompson

2008

Memory & Cognition

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dIn three studies, we examined simple counterexample-based and probabilistic reasoning in children 6, 7, and 9 years of age. In the first study, participants were asked to make conditional (if-f f then) inferences under both categorical (certain or uncertain) and probabilistic instructions. Results showed that 6-year-olds respond to both forms of inference in similar ways, but whereas probabilistic conditional inferences showed little development over this p period, categorical inferences clearly improved between 6 and 7 years of age. An analysis of the children's justifications indicated that performance under categorical instructions was strongly related to counterexample generation at all ages, whereas this was true only for the younger children for inferences under probabilistic instructions. These findings were replicated in a second study, using problems that referred to concrete stimuli with varying p probabilities of inference. A third study tested the hypothesis that children confused probability judgments with judgments of confidence and demonstrated a clear dissociation between these two constructs. Overall, these judgments of confidence and demonstrated a clear dissociation between these two constructs. Overall, these results show that children are capable of accurate conditional inferences under probabilistic instructions at a very t early age and that the differentiation between categorical and probabilistic conditional reasoning is clear by at least 9 years of age. These results are globally consistent with dual-process theories but suggest some difficulties for the way that the analytic-heuristic distinction underlying these theories has been conceptualized.

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confidence: 99%

Different developmental patterns of simple deductive and probabilistic inferential reasoning

Markovits

Thompson

2008

Memory & Cognition

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“…Compelling evidence exists for numerous differences-some of which (e.g., conditional reasoning) have been found across cultures and cohorts-between preadolescents and adolescents. Specifically, adolescents are better able than preadolescents to integrate information from multiple sources, coordinate beliefs with evidence, appreciate the influence of social roles on decisions, understand the cultural underpinnings of social conventions, consider alternative perspectives, reason scientifically, construct cogent arguments that both support and contravene their personal beliefs, and apply their decision-making skills flexibly (see Helwig, 2006;Klaczynski, 2009;Kuhn, 2008;Markovits, 2007;Markovits & Barrouillet, 2002;Markovits & Vachon, 1990;Moshman, 2009;Müller, Overton, & Reene, 2001;O'Brien and Overton, 1980;Overton & Ricco, 2010;Turiel, 2002). 2 An unpublished study of responses to arguments for setting precedents also supports the view that the age differences reported here represent developmental progressions.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Age differences in understanding precedent-setting decisions and authorities’ responses to violations of deontic rules

Klaczynski

2011

Journal of Experimental Child Psychology

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“…1988;O'Brien and Overton. 1980;Overton etal., 1985Overton etal., , 1987, The limited role of meaning in formal operational logic, however, prevents the logic from adequately serving as a competence model for forms of rationality that arc not as syntactically driven as hypothesis testing.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revising the Logic of Operations as a Relevance Logic: From Hypothesis Testing to Explanation

Ricco

1993

Human Development

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Piaget’s last writings, particularly those coauthored by Garcia [Piaget and Garcia, 1974, 1989, 1991], contain both a coherent constructivist account of explanation in science [Piaget and Garcia, 1989] and specific suggestions for revising the logic of operations as a logic of meanings, based on the relevance logic of Anderson and Belnap [1975] – see Piaget [1980] and Piaget and Garcia [1991]. The aim of the present article is to demonstrate the interdependence of these two significant developments in Piaget’s later work, by examining the merits of Piaget’s revised logical competence model as a logic of causal explanation. Whereas the logic of operations is sufficient as a logic of hypothesis testing, its basis in truth-functional logic provides too narrow a treatment of semantic issues to properly model causal explanation, a form of thought characterized by a strong interdependence of form and content. The logic of meanings, as an intensional logic, rejects the reduction of meaning to truth conditions and introduces issues of relevance and context into logic.

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Conditional reasoning following contradictory evidence: A developmental analysis

Cited by 67 publications

References 20 publications

Different developmental patterns of simple deductive and probabilistic inferential reasoning

Different developmental patterns of simple deductive and probabilistic inferential reasoning

Age differences in understanding precedent-setting decisions and authorities’ responses to violations of deontic rules

Revising the Logic of Operations as a Relevance Logic: From Hypothesis Testing to Explanation

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