Conexões sociais e rotatividade involuntária do CEO: evidências do mercado brasileiro

Locatelli, Letícia Gomes; Ramos, Fernando Maciel; Costa, Cristiano Machado

doi:10.5007/2175-8069.2021.e76116

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…Subsequently, the criterion of the weighted sum of factors by shared variance was applied, generating a new continuous variable for each CEO in each year analyzed (PwCEOit). The variable 𝐼𝐶𝑆𝐶𝐴 𝑖𝑡 was measured from 5 indicators (Table 2) considering educational, professional, and family aspects, based on previous studies (Dimitrova, 2017;Fracassi & Tate, 2012;Kang et al, 2018;Krishnan et al, 2011;McGuinness, 2016;Schmidt, 2015;Wilbanks et al, 2017, Ramos, 2020, Locatelli et al, 2021. The calculated index is established on a scale from 0 to 1, and the closer to 1, the greater the social tie between the CEO and the board.…”

Section: Methodological Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Participation in Boards 1 when the director has already worked on the board of another company where the CEO also worked as a director and 0 otherwise. Equation 4 presents the formula used to calculate the CEO x BD social tie index per company/year (Locatelli et al, 2021;Ramos, 2020). The third independent variable (PwCEO*ICSCA) (H3) was operationalized from the interaction between the variables PwCEOit and 𝐼𝐶𝑆𝐶𝐴 𝑖𝑡 to allow testing the effect of the relationship between the CEO power and the level of social tie on the earnings management of the analyzed companies.…”

Section: Eachmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Earnings Management

Locatelli¹,

Ramos²,

Sprenger³

2021

Rev. Cat. Cien. Cont.

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This study aimed to analyze the influence of powerful CEOs on earnings management (EM) considering the presence of social connections between the CEO and members of the board of directors (CA). The sample consisted of 183 Brazilian companies listed in [B]³ in the period 2011 to 2017, totaling 881 observations. EM was measured by the Jones (1991) and Modified Jones (1995) models and considered the dependent variable, under which the effect of (i) a CEO power metric developed by principal component analysis was analyzed from a multidimensional perspective of power (structural power, ownership power, power of specialization and power of prestige), (ii) an index that measures the level of social connections between the CEO and the Board members based on indicators already reviewed by the literature (educational, professional and family relationships background), and (iii) the interaction between these variables. The results of 6 linear regression estimates (MQO) with cross-section pools and robust errors indicate that powerful CEOs are related to higher levels of discretionary accruals, while social connections mitigate EM. When the interaction between these variables is included, both CEO power and social connections lose their significant effect on EM, indicating that in the presence of social connections, powerful CEOs may fail to engage in EM practices. This result contributes to the discussion about the interference of social factors on economic decisions, drawing attention to the impact of social factors on the quality of profits and the CG of companies.

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Section: Methodological Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Eachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Earnings Management

Locatelli¹,

Ramos²,

Sprenger³

2021

Rev. Cat. Cien. Cont.

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“…Posteriormente, foi aplicado o critério da soma ponderada dos fatores pela variância compartilhada, gerando uma nova variável contínua para cada CEO em cada ano analisado (PwCEOit). A variável 𝐼𝐶𝑆𝐶𝐴 𝑖𝑡 foi mensurada a partir de 5 indicadores (Tabela 2) considerando aspectos educacionais, profissionais e familiares, com base em estudos precedentes (Dimitrova, 2017;Fracassi & Tate, 2012;Kang et al, 2018;Krishnan et al, 2011;McGuinness, 2016;Schmidt, 2015;Wilbanks et al, 2017, Ramos, 2020, Locatelli et al, 2021. O índice apurado é estabelecido em uma escala de 0 a 1, sendo que quanto mais próximo de 1, maior é a conexão social do CEO com o conselho.…”

Section: Procedimentos Metodológicosunclassified

“…O índice foi apurado para cada ano e empresa analisada. Na equação 4, apresenta-se a fórmula utilizada para apuração do índice de conexão social CEO x CA por empresa/ano (Locatelli et al, 2021;Ramos, 2020).…”

Section: Procedimentos Metodológicosunclassified

Gerenciamento de resultados

Locatelli

Ramos

Sprenger

2021

Rev. Cat. Cien. Cont.

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Este estudo teve como objetivo analisar a influência de CEOs poderosos no gerenciamento de resultados (GR) considerando a presença de conexões sociais entre o CEO e os membros do Conselho de Administração (CA). A amostra foi constituída de 183 empresas brasileiras listadas na [B]3 S.A. no período de 2011 a 2017, totalizando 881 observações. O GR foi mensurado pelo modelo de Jones (1991) e Jones Modificado (1995) e considerada a variável dependente, sob qual foi analisado o efeito de: (i) uma métrica de poder do CEO desenvolvida por análise de componentes principais a partir de uma ótica multidimensional de poder (poder estrutural, poder de propriedade, poder de especialização e poder de prestígio), (ii) um índice que mensura o nível das conexões sociais entre o CEO e os membros do CA a partir de indicadores já revisados pela literatura (background educacional, profissional e relações familiares), e (iii) a interação entre estas variáveis. Os resultados das 6 estimações de regressões lineares (MQO) com pools de cross-section e erros-robustos indicam que CEOs poderosos estão relacionados a maiores níveis de accruals discricionários, enquanto as conexões sociais mitigam o GR. Quando incluída a interação entre essas variáveis, tanto o poder do CEO quanto as conexões sociais perdem o efeito significativo sobre o GR, indicando que na presença das conexões sociais, CEOs poderosos podem deixar de se engajar em práticas de GR. Esse resultado contribui para a discussão sobre a interferência de fatores sociais sobre decisões econômicas chamando atenção para o impacto de fatores socias na qualidade dos lucros e na GC das empresas.

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“…The data collection has become easier since the issuing of R packages to do so, such as GetFREData package (Perlin, Kirch, & Vancin, 2018). Locatelli, Ramos, and Costa (2021) used this package to collect Brazilian companies' data from Reference Form from 2012 to 2018 to evaluate the effects of social ties on CEO turnover. Likewise, Mastella, Vancin, Perlin, and Kirch (2021) also collected data from Reference Form to investigate the effects of board gender diversity on performance and risk taking in Brazilian companies.…”

Section: Introduction Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Board of Directors’ Interlocks: A Social Network Analysis Tutorial

et al. 2023

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Objective: the literature on board interlocks has increased in recent years, focusing on understanding board composition and its relationships with other companies’ boards. Such studies usually require multiple procedures of data extraction, handling, and analysis to create and analyze social networks. However, these procedures are not standardized, and there is a lack of methodological instructions available to make this process easier for researchers. This tutorial intends to describe the logical steps taken to collect data, treat them, and map and measure the network properties to provide researchers with the sources to replicate it in their own research. We contribute to the literature in the management field by proposing an empirical methodological approach to conduct board interlocks’ research. Proposal: our tutorial describes and provides examples of data collection, directors’ data treatment, and the use of these data to map and measure network structural properties using an open-source tool - R statistical software. Conclusions: our main contribution is a tutorial detailing the steps required to map and analyze board interlocks, making this process easier, standardized, and more accessible for all researchers who wish to develop social network analysis studies.

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Conexões sociais e rotatividade involuntária do CEO: evidências do mercado brasileiro

Cited by 6 publications

References 51 publications

Earnings Management

Earnings Management

Gerenciamento de resultados

Board of Directors’ Interlocks: A Social Network Analysis Tutorial

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